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A DUBIOUS GRAIL: SEEKING TORT LAW
EXPANSION AND LIMITED PERSONHOOD
AS STEPPING STONES TOWARD
ABOLISHING ANIMALS'
PROPERTY STATUS
Richard L. Cupp Jr.*
OME grails are sought one piece at a time. The holy grail for many
animal rights activists is abolishing animals' property status. This is
an ambition befitting mythical grail status in its level of difficulty
given current societal mores and values. It is too inconsistent with our
strongly rooted societal paradigm to afford any hope of realization in the
near future. Thus, rather than expecting to capture the grail in the short
term, many animal rights legal advocates are seeking more manageable
steps that may someday lead to the elimination or modification of prop-
erty status. This Article critiques such efforts, specifically focusing on two
potential stepping stones that may be perceived as particularly desirable
for animal rights activists: seeking limited personhood for intelligent spe-
cies of animals, such as chimpanzees; and the possible expansion of tort
law to provide animals standing as plaintiffs whose interests are repre-
sented by court-appointed humans.
I. INTRODUCTION
Animal rights law is growing explosively. The animal rights movement
started gaining attention in the 1970s and 80s, but in those decades it was
primarily a philosophical and moral movement rather than a law-based
movement. Philosopher Peter Singer's 1975 book entitled Animal Liber-
* John W. Wade Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Pepperdine
University School of Law. Advisor, American Veterinary Medical Association
Noneconomic Damages Task Force, 2005; Advisor, National Association for Biomedical
Research, 2004 to present. I wish to thank Jennifer Allison, Ryan Deam, Nathaniel Higa,
Laura Hock, and Jillian Rice for their outstanding research assistance. I also wish to thank
the National Association for Biomedical Research and Pepperdine University School of
Law for providing separate research grants related to this Article. Finally, I wish to thank
David Favre and Steven Wise for graciously reading a previous draft of this Article and
providing helpful comments on the portions of the Article critiquing their thoughtful work.
I dedicate this Article to Shasta, the Husky/Shepherd mix who has been my faithful
friend and buddy for the past thirteen years. We are in happy agreement that unique and
precious property is the appropriate paradigm in human/animal relationships, though we
gently differ as to which is the owner and which is the owned.
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ation' was a significant influence, but Singer is a philosopher, not a law-
yer, and his book reflected that.
In the past decade, an enormous change has begun. The animal rights
movement has evolved from a moral/philosophical basis to a pragmatic,
increasingly sophisticated legal action basis, and it has done so with star-
tling rapidity on a large scale. Ten years ago, for example, there were
only perhaps one or two animal law courses being taught at United States
law schools. Now there are approximately seventy, with most of the na-
tion's elite law schools represented.2 Several prominent law schools have
taken a step further. Bob Barker, host of the television show The Price Is
Right, has provided million-dollar gifts to nine highly respected law
schools to establish animal rights centers. 3 Included among these law
schools with new animal rights centers are Harvard, Stanford, Columbia,
Georgetown, Northwestern, Duke, and UCLA.4
At least three scholarly legal journals dedicated exclusively to animal
law have been established over the past ten years, two of them in 2006.5
Animal rights legal organizations have proliferated, and older organiza-
tions, such as the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), have exper-
ienced dramatic growth. 6 A small organization only a decade ago, the
ALDF now claims to have over 100,000 members.7
Thirteen years ago, the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund had just
one law school chapter.8 It now has chapters at 87 out of a total of 181
American Bar Association ("ABA")-approved law schools, with many
more on the way.9 Many state bar associations have in recent years cre-
ated animal law sections.10 Even the ABA, the nation's largest and per-
haps most mainstream legal organization, recently created an animal law
section.11
1. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975).
2. See NABR Animal Law Section, Animal Law Courses, http://www.nabr.org/
animallaw/LawSchools/AnimalLawCourses.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). See also
Animal Legal Defense Fund, http://www.aldf.org/ (last visited June 30, 2006) [hereinafter
ALDF].
3. See William Hageman, Early Steps Taken on Road to Animal Law, CHI. TRIB.,
June 5, 2005, at 3A.
4. See id.
5. Lewis & Clark Law School, ANIMAL LAW REVIEW, http://www.lclark.edu/org/
animalaw/ (established in 1995, last visited Nov. 12, 2006); University of Pennsylvania Law
School, JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW AND ETHIcs, http://www.law.upenn.edu/groups/jale/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Michigan State University, JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW, http://
www.animallaw.info/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
6. See ALDF, supra note 2, at http://www.aldf.org/about.asp?sect=about.
7. See id.
8. National Center for Animal Law, http://www.lclark.edu/org/ncal/lewisandclark
.html (last visited June 30, 2006).
9. See ALDF, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bar Animal Law Committee, http://www.pabar.org/public/
committees/animal/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Texas Bar Animal Law Section, http://www
.animallawsection.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Washington Bar Animal Law Section,
http://wsba.org/lawyers/groups/animallaw/defaultl.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
11. The American Bar Association, Animal Law Committee, http://www.abanet.org/
tips/animal/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
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Several nationally prominent constitutional law scholars with generally
expansive views of rights, including Alan Dershowitz,12 Martha Nuss-
baum, 13 Cass Sunstein,14 and Laurence Tribe,15 have in the past decade
written articles supporting legal rights for animals. Animal rights-related
state and federal legislative efforts by legal action groups have rapidly
increased. For example, in the past decade, legislation has been proposed
in at least ten states seeking to allow expanded tort damages for harm to
animals, and the effort has already been successful in a few states. 16 For a
particularly powerful example, as recently as 1994, animal cruelty was a
felony in only fifteen states-but it is now a felony in forty-one states and
in the District of Columbia. 17
Steven Wise's book Rattling the Cage,18 published in 2000, and his re-
lated 2002 book, Drawing the Line,' 9 are perhaps the most prominent
intellectual products of the burgeoning animal rights movement. In the
books, Wise argues that property status should first be eliminated for es-
pecially intelligent animals, such as chimpanzees and bonobos, based on
12. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THE-
ORY OF THE ORIGINS OF RIGHTS (2005); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE (2002).
13. See generally MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (2004); Martha C. Nussbaum, Steven M. Wise's
Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506 (2001) (book
review).
14. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, 115
ETHICS 351 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (2003);
Cass R. Sunstein, Enforcing Existing Rights, 8 ANIMAL L. i (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Stand-
ing for Animals, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000).
15. See Laurence Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us
About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1 (2001).
16. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a (2006) (allowing for punitive damages up to
$3,500); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1 to 70/16.4 (2005) (providing for punitive damages of not
less than $500 and not more than $25,000 for each act of abuse or neglect); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 44-17-403 (2005) (allowing for up to $5,000 in noneconomic damages in the death
of a pet caused by the negligent act of another). See also H.R. 03-1260, 64th Gen. Assem.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003), available at http://www.nabr.org/animallaw/VetMalpractice/
COHB1260072904.pdf; H.R. 648, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005); H.R. 941, 2005 Gen.
Assem., 2005 Sess. (Md. 2005); S.B 932, 2003 (Mass. 2003); H.R. 1379 2002 S., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2007); H.R. 5433, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005); H.R. 2411, 211th Leg.,
2004 Sess. (N.J. 2004); H.R. 3585, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005). See generally
National Association for Biomedical Research, Animal Law Section, http://www.nabr.org/
animallawfDamages/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (listing enacted, proposed, and
failed state legislation providing for noneconomic damages in animal tort cases).
17. ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, FELONY STATUS LIST (2006), http://www.aldf.org/
uploads/FelonyStatusList%204-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). See also, Inhu-
mane.com, Animal Cruelty Laws by States, http://www.inhumane.org/data/crueltylaws
.html (last visited July 3, 2006); American Humane Association, http://www.americanhu-
mane.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (under "Take Action" drop down menu follow "State
Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Animal cruelty state summary" hyperlink).
18. STEVEN M. WISE, RA-LING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
(2000).




increasing evidence of their capacity for "practical autonomy. '20 Accord-
ing to Wise, such animals are functionally analogous to children and in-
competent adults, and should similarly be granted fundamental autonomy
rights as persons.2 1
Wise recognizes, however, that courts are not likely to accept per-
sonhood for intelligent animals anytime soon.22 Thus, he advocates a
stepping stone approach toward that goal, and he also seems sympathetic
toward the related (and even more ambitious) goal of eliminating all ani-
mals' property status as it currently exists.23 The stepping stone approach
is to pursue evolution in a number of legal arenas that will not directly
lead to rights, but which will pave the way for eventual abolition of prop-
erty status for some or all animals through incremental heightening of
their legal status.
Tort law is one of the most significant areas of focus in the stepping
stone approach toward eventual abolition of animals' property status.
24
Professor David Favre has perhaps pushed the tort envelope the furthest
in a recent law review article, titled Judicial Recognition of the Rights of
Animals-A New Tort, which argues that even without abolition of prop-
erty status, animals should be permitted status as plaintiffs (represented
by court-appointed humans) in an expansive new tort action.25
This Article will analyze Steven Wise's work in Rattling the Cage and
Drawing the Line, advocating limited personhood for some animal spe-
cies, and David Favre's proposals in A New Tort, as illustrative of efforts
at incremental movement toward animal rights and the abolition or modi-
fication of property status for animals. Part II addresses the elimination
of property status as the grail for many in the animal rights movement,
with special emphasis on Rattling the Cage and Drawing the Line as influ-
ential grail roadmaps. It analyzes the "practical autonomy" scale pro-
posed in the books as an approach to determining when basic rights
should be recognized. Part II also critiques Drawing the Line's proposed
20. WISE, supra note 18, at 179, 243-48, 251-57, 270; WISE, supra note 19, at 7, 32-33,
47, 157-58, 205-06, 235-38.
21. WISE, supra note 18, at 12, 57, 86-7, 144-54 (outlining the "Rings of Conscious-
ness," developed through the extensive study of human children and analogizing it to chim-
panzee development); id. at 163-72 (describing and comparing the effects of socialization
on both human children and chimpanzees); id. at 244 (quoting Care and Protection of Beth,
587 N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (Mass. 1928) "'[c]ognitive ability is not a prerequisite for enjoying
basic liberties"'); WISE, supra note 19, at 236 ("[A] normal human child possesses the
practical autonomy sufficient for dignity-rights by age eight months .... Any nonhuman
animal with practical autonomy is similar to this child in ways highly relevant to the posses-
sion of basic legal rights. As a matter of equality, [a chimpanzee] is certainly entitled to
them.").
22. See WISE, supra note 18, at 4-5.
23. Id.; WISE, supra note 19, at 9 (stating that "[a]n advocate for the legal rights for
nonhuman animals must proceed one step at a time..."); id. at 234-35 (comparing his
position for the animal rights movement to Lincoln's strategy for gaining rights for black
slaves).
24. See infra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
25. See generally David S. Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Rights of Animals-A New
Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333.
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use of a "precautionary principle" to support its rights argument, and
both books' efforts to analogize to standing granted to nonliving entities
such as corporations to buttress their assertions. Finally, Part II discusses
the books' efforts to compare the animal rights movement to the develop-
ment of civil rights for slaves, women, and children. Part III seeks to
identify implications of Wise's proposals to extend rights to animals.
Identifying legal standing as a likely battlefield for assertions of animal
personhood, Part III raises concerns about the competitive nature of
rights and the implications for moral responsibility and the societal com-
pact if personhood for animals were allowed in a standing dispute or
other type of dispute. Part III concludes that courts will not accept any
form of personhood in the reasonably near future, and that doing so
would cause harmful societal consequences.
Part IV addresses the stepping stone approach to gradually eroding an-
imals' property status, of which proposed limited rights for intelligent
species is a prominent example. Part IV also discusses arguments prof-
fered for an incremental approach to animal rights and addresses several
of the other legal stepping stones (in addition to efforts to attain limited
personhood for intelligent species) currently being pursued. Part V ana-
lyzes in some depth the possibility of expanding tort law to grant animals
status as plaintiffs (represented by humans appointed by the courts) as a
stepping stone toward eliminating property status. Part V concludes that,
as with other proposed stepping stones seeking to treat animals similarly
to humans, the proposed new tort is untenable and contrary to public
policy.
II. THE GRAIL OF ELIMINATING PROPERTY STATUS AND
ANIMAL PERSONHOOD
Rattling the Cage's model of eventual personhood for particularly intel-
ligent animals serves as a particularly influential roadmap for the animal
rights movement in its efforts to eventually achieve the grail of eliminat-
ing animals' property status. Wise is probably the most prominent legal
activist in the United States promoting the concept of animal rights.
Describing himself as an "animal protection lawyer," he has practiced
''animal law" for more than twenty-five years and has taught animal law
courses at Harvard Law School, Vermont Law School, and John Marshall
Law School.26
Wise was an early leading figure in the Animal Legal Defense Fund,
and, beginning in 2000, he received a great deal of attention both in the
media27 and in the legal academic community with the publication of Rat-
26. See WISE, supra note 19, at xi.
27. Wise has made numerous other national and local television and radio appear-
ances, and he is quoted frequently in print media about animal rights issues. See, e.g., Clau-
dia Dreifus, A Conversation With-Steven Wise: A Courtroom Champion for 4-Legged
Creatures, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at 2; Anita Hamilton, Woof, Woof, Your Honor, TIME,
Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/archive (enter "woof, woof' into the
search pane); Staff Writer, Beastly Behavior?, WASH. POST, June 5, 2002, at C01; Stephanie
2007]
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ling the Cage.28 Famed anthropologist Jane Goodall wrote a foreword
for the book, which was favorably reviewed by prominent constitutional
law scholar Cass Sunstein in the New York Times Book Review. 29 Fed-
eral judge and former University of Chicago law professor Richard Pos-
ner, another of the nation's most prominent legal thinkers, also found the
book interesting and published a review.30 Since then, Wise's theories
have received support from other well-known scholars with expansive
views of rights, such as Harvard Law School professors Alan Dershowitz
and Laurence Tribe. 31
In 2002, Wise followed up on Rattling the Cage with Drawing the
Line.32 Both Rattling the Cage and Drawing the Line focus on arguments
for extending some basic level of liberty and equality rights to relatively
intelligent animals, such as great apes.33 Rattling the Cage sets forth
Wise's fundamental premise and provides arguments supporting his pre-
mise. 34 The book's basic argument is that throughout history, notions
about the nature and existence of rights have evolved in keeping with
shifting societal mores and values and new scientific discoveries, and that
with the scientific discoveries made in recent years regarding the intelli-
gence and abilities of some animals, such as great apes, we have evolved
to a point where courts should extend some degree of basic rights to these
animals. 35
Rattling the Cage does not argue that great apes should be awarded all
of the rights held by humans. For example, it does not argue that great
apes should be given the right to vote or to receive educational opportu-
nities equal to those given to humans.36 Rather, it argues loosely for
what might be described as dignity rights, such as the right not to be en-
Zimmerman, Scholars Debate How Far Animal Rights Should Go, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr.
15 2001, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4155/is_20010415/ain139
03819/pg2.
28. WISE, supra note 18.
29. Cass R. Sunstein, The Chimps' Day in Court, THE N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Feb.
20, 2000 available at http://www.nytimes.comipages/books/ (enter "The Chimps' Day in
Court" into the search pane).
30. See generally Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527 (2002).
31. See supra notes 12, 15 and accompanying text.
32. See WISE, supra note 19.
33. See generally WISE, supra note 18; WISE, supra note 19.
34. See generally WISE, supra note 18.
35. Id. at 179-237 (outlining the scientific discoveries made about the inner workings
of the chimpanzee mind); id. at 237 ("Whatever legal rights these apes may be entitled to
spring from the complexities of their minds."); id. at 261 ("Determining the dignity-rights
of chimpanzees and bonobos in accordance with the fundamental principles of Western
law-equality, liberty, and reasoned judicial decisionmaking-reemphasizes and reinvigo-
rates these principles..."). See generally id. at 131-34 (describing the similarity between
the genetic makeup and brains of humans and chimpanzees).
36. See id. at 243-48 (admitting that he "[is] not argu[ing] that any chimpanzee or
bonobo has full autonomy..." and therefore concedes the limited nature of the rights he
desires for highly intelligent species of nonhuman animals). For an illustration of other
animal rights thinkers adopting this "limited rights" approach, see Adam J. Fumarola, With
Best Friends Like Us Who Needs Enemies: The Phenomenon of the Puppy Mill, the Failure
of Legal Remedies to Manage It, and the Positive Aspects of Animal Rights, 6 BuFF. ENvrL.
L.J. 253, 286-88 (1999).
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slaved (for example, in a zoo or in a research lab,) and the right not to
have one's body used in medical experiments. 37 Rattling the Cage and
Drawing the Line are written for a general educated audience rather than
for lawyers, and they do not flesh out detailed theories on how specific
constitutional provisions should or should not apply to great apes and
other intelligent animal species. Instead, their analyses center more
broadly on the general nature of fundamental rights. The books under-
take to erode resistance to the basic principle of denying all rights to all
animals, and they leave many specifics of arguments on particular rights
to others (or perhaps to future books).
The generality of Wise's approach does not reflect a lack of ambition
for his cause. Rather, he doubtlessly recognizes that the most important
initial battle is over the question of whether rights should ever be ex-
tended to animals in any form. If any notion of rights for animals, how-
ever general, is accepted by courts, the consequences will be enormous,
and the subsequent battles over which specific rights should apply and to
which animals they should apply will entail much smaller legal and intel-
lectual leaps.
Following an introductory story about the suffering of a chimpanzee
named Jerome who was intentionally infected with the HIV virus in a
research laboratory (perhaps intended to touch readers' emotions and
make them more receptive to changes in the law that could prevent such
suffering), Rattling the Cage begins with an analysis of the history of ani-
mals' legal and moral status in human society. 38 Although the book does
not spare the ancient Greek philosophers, it assigns much of the blame
for animals' subjugation to Jewish and Christian religious teachings. 39
Both Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian teachings ascribe to the
"Great Chain of Being," a concept frequently referenced throughout
both books.40
According to the Great Chain of Being presupposition, all life forms
may be placed on a conceptual ladder of importance or value.41 Animals
occupy the lowest rungs of the ladder, humans are higher up, and spiri-
tual and divine beings, such as angels or gods, are at the top of the lad-
der.42 Beings lower on the ladder were created to serve the beings higher
37. See WISE, supra note 18, at 7 ("I hope you will conclude, as I do ... that justice
entitles chimpanzees and bonobos to legal personhood and to the fundamental legal rights
of bodily integrity and bodily liberty .... ); id. at 49 (defining bodily integrity and bodily
liberty); id. at 79 ("Dignity-rights rather than human rights ... more accurately describes
these fundamental rights."); id. at 100 (identifying the "two most important [areas] with
respect to dignity-rights, [as] liberty and equality."); id. at 267 (summarizing his argument,
"we must replace the legal thinghood of chimpanzees and bonobos with a legal personhood
that immunizes them from serious infringements upon their bodily integrity and bodily
liberty").
38. Id. at 9-48.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 11 (the first of multiple references to the influence of the "Great Chain





on the ladder.43 Jews and Christians channeled this thinking into the idea
that humans have immortal souls but animals do not, and that this distinc-
tion calls for treating humans with infinite dignity and treating animals as
lesser beings placed on earth for the benefit and use of humans." Under
Jewish and Christian thought, humans were created to serve God, and
animals were created to serve humans.4 5
After introducing the history of human subjugation of animals, Rattling
the Cage explores the nature and history of rights. It emphasizes the ide-
als of liberty and equality as the basis for rights, and asserts (correctly)
that ideas about how broadly rights should be extended have slowly
evolved over time.4 6 The gradual evolution of mores, values, and legal
principles is an important theme for Wise. He describes change in these
areas as often taking place "funeral by funeral," arguing that core ideas
are so deeply imbedded in our psyches that we find it difficult to change
our views even when they are objectively untenable.47 However, our
children may be slightly more open to a new idea that challenges existing
thought, and their children may be more open yet to the new idea, and so
on, until gradually, funeral by funeral, the new idea gains general
acceptance. 48
Recent scientific discoveries about the intelligence, communicative
abilities, and emotional capacities of great apes are the lynchpin of Rat-
tling the Cage's hope for gradual acceptance of the idea that great apes
should be afforded rights.4 9 It rejects as irrational Judeo-Christian relig-
ious tenets affirming the ascendancy of humans, and it argues that philo-
sophical and scientific writers' historical efforts to justify subjugating all
animals because they do not have consciousness, cannot communicate,
cannot use tools, are not self-aware, cannot feel emotions, etc., have been
destroyed by recent findings that great apes (and, with some of these
traits, other animals) have and can do all of these things that were previ-
ously thought limited only to humans.50
In Drawing the Line, Wise undertakes to be more specific, not in ana-
lyzing particular rights in detail, but in creating a framework for deciding
which animals should be entitled to basic dignity rights. Drawing the Line
makes clear that Wise has been criticized by some other animal rights
activists for his focus in Rattling the Cage on animals that typically have
high intelligence, such as great apes. He responds that "[i]f I were Chief
Justice of the Universe, I might make the simpler capacity to suffer,




46. See id. at 49-87.
47. Id. at 72 (quoting economist Paul Samuelson).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 179-81.
50. See id. at 119-237.
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rights."'51 However, he is a pragmatist, and does not believe judges are
likely to assign rights based on the ability of animals to suffer because of
the overwhelming practical consequences for human society of such a de-
velopment. 52 His notion of rights based on "practical autonomy," he ar-
gues, would have a much more limited impact on human society and is
thus much more likely to be accepted at some point by judges. 53
A. A SCALE OF PRACTICAL AUTONOMY
The primary purposes of Wise's follow-up book, Drawing the Line,
seem to be the following:
1) Proposing a formula for when animals may be found to exercise or
to have practical autonomy and thus be entitled to personhood and basic
dignity rights;54 and
2) Applying that formula to scientific knowledge about a number of
individual members of animal species (chimpanzees, bonobos, orang-
utans, gorillas, honeybees, African grey parrots, dogs, dolphins, and ele-
phants) to determine what degree of practical autonomy (and thus, what
rights, if any) should be assigned to them. 55
Drawing the Line borrows its scale of practical autonomy from the
work of Dr. Donald Griffin, whom Wise describes as the father of cogni-
tive ethology.56 Griffin acknowledges that how much particular animals
feel, want, act intentionally, know, and are self-aware is not scientifically
knowable at this time. 57 Thus, he has created a scale ranging from 0.0 to
1.0, with the point value being closer to 1.0 the more likely the answer is
"yes," to the above questions.58 Griffin and Wise believe that all animals
51. WISE, supra note 19, at 34.
52. The practical impact of granting rights based on the ability to suffer would be
enormous. Such a finding would immediately impact the use of animals for food, and cloth-
ing, scientific research on almost any animals, and other economic uses, such as the ability
of humans to kill or otherwise control animals that might interfere with human endeavors
(as one of thousands of potential examples, killing rodents who are destroying crops). The
enormous practical "cost" of granting such rights is the basis of Wise's determination that
rights based on "practical autonomy" are a much easier sell than rights based on the ability
to suffer. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
53. WISE, supra note 19, at 32
([A] being has practical autonomy and is entitled to personhood and basic
liberty rights if she: 1. can desire; 2. can intentionally try to fulfill her desires;
and 3. possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even
dimly, that it is she who wants something and it is she who is trying to get it.);
id. at 34.
([T]he capacity to suffer appears irrelevant to common-law judges in their
consideration of who is entitled to basic rights. What is at least sufficient is
practical autonomy .... I may not like it much myself. But philosophers
argue moral rights; judges decide legal rights. And so I present a legal, and
not a philosophical, argument for the dignity-rights of nonhuman animals.).
54. Id. at 35-47.
55. Id. at 49-230.
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id.
58. And, of course, with the point value being closer to 0.0, the likelier the answer is
"no" to any of these questions. See id. See also DONALD R. GRIFFIN, ANIMAL MINDS:
BEYOND COGNITION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 11 (2001).
2007]
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may be divided into four categories on this scale of probability of con-
sciousness and sophisticated mental abilities: Category One: almost 1.0;
Category Two: above 0.50; Category 3: exactly 0.50; and Category Four:
below 0.50.59 Drawing the Line argues that all animals falling into Cate-
gory One "clearly possess sufficient practical autonomy to qualify them
for basic liberty rights."60 It describes consciousness as the "bedrock" of
practical autonomy, 61 and in both Drawing the Line and Rattling the
Cage, Wise seeks to link intelligence, communicative ability, and self-rec-
ognition to the notion of consciousness. 62
Drawing the Line concludes that chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans,
gorillas, and dolphins are Category One animals possessing practical au-
tonomy, and that clearly they should be granted dignity rights.63 It places
honeybees toward the bottom of Category Two, 64 dogs near the middle of
Category Two,65 and African elephants and African grey parrots near the
top of Category Two.66 Drawing the Line argues that animals near the
top of Category Two, such as African grey parrots that have been the
subject of experiments related to consciousness, should be entitled to dig-
nity rights. 67
Along with other problems,68 the approach taken by Rattling the Cage
and Drawing the Line is vexed by a lack of scientific or societal consensus
on the parameters of consciousness. 69 The books' approach to finding
consciousness seems general and loose; they seem to throw out a number
of arguments for finding consciousness in some animals with the hope
that one or more of them will stick. A basic premise in the books seems
to be that most humans are conscious, and thus the more animals are like
us, the stronger the argument that they are also conscious. 70 The books
point out numerous similarities between great apes (and other intelligent
animals) and humans in terms of emotional capacity, intelligence, ability
59. WISE, supra note 19, at 35.
60. Id. at 36. Wise argues that animal should be included in Category One if the cer-
tainty that they are self-aware and highly intelligent is .90 or higher. See id.
61. Id. at 37.
62. WISE, supra note 18, at 119-62, 186-222 (discussing many of the chimpanzees' abili-
ties ranging from counting to nonlanguage symbolic communication). WISE, supra note 19,
at 35-38.




67. Id. at 112.
68. See, e.g., infra notes 80-180 and accompanying text.
69. Compare TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 33 (2d ed. 2004) ("Com-
mon sense and ordinary language favor the attribution of consciousness and a mental life
to many animals ... animal behavior is consistent with viewing them as conscious..."),
and GRIFFIN, supra note 58, at 1) (clearly stating his view in the title of the first chapter,
"In Favor of Animal Consciousness"), with MICHAEL LEAHY, AGAINST LIBERATION: PUT-
TING ANIMALS IN PERSPECTIVE 140 (1994) (examining commonly held beliefs about animal
rights and consciousness), and Bob Bermond, The Myth of Animal Suffering, in THE
ANIMAL ETHICS READER 79 (2003) (claiming that the lack of a developed prefrontal cor-
tex and the capacity for reflection prohibits nonhuman suffering).
70. See WISE, supra note 18, at 120-22.
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to communicate, self-awareness, etc. 71 However, Wise acknowledges that
many scientists reject assigning consciousness to animals 72 and several
writers addressing the subject contend that if we cannot be certain what
animals are thinking, we also cannot make conclusions that they think
like we do.73
Further, Rattling the Cage acknowledges that philosophers and scien-
tists are hopelessly divided on how the concept of consciousness should
even be defined. 74 It summarizes the "top ten" theories of consciousness,
subtitling the section "Nobody Has a Clue."'75 It quotes the International
Dictionary of Psychology's description of consciousness as "a fascinating
but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it
does, or why it has evolved."'76
Because consciousness is, as Wise says, the "bedrock" of his theory of
practical autonomy, and scientists, philosophers, and psychologists have
no agreement on whether animals may be conscious or even how to de-
fine consciousness among animals, the practical autonomy theory is not
likely to seriously challenge judicial precedents disallowing rights for ani-
mals anytime soon. Drawing the Line's elaborate "Scale of Practical Au-
tonomy," with its four major categories and many gradations within those
four categories, seeks to establish a sense of clarity where clarity is not
possible to attain-at least given our present understanding of animals.
For example, despite relying on scientific findings susceptible to multiple
interpretations, the book extends its autonomy scale to two places to the
right of a decimal point, assigning an autonomy value on its 0-1 scale of
0.59 to honeybees,77 0.68 to a dog that was studied,78 0.78 to an African
grey parrot that was studied,79 and so forth.
This effort to identify precise gradations of consciousness and practical
autonomy in the face of such uncertainty and lack of consensus is not
likely to impress most courts. Indeed, the intricate and strained model
developed may in fact provide ammunition for arguments against per-
sonhood for animals. It serves to highlight the probability that courts
will, at least for many years, reject finding new rights that would create
significant social upheaval given the present lack of certainty or consen-
71. Id.
72. See id. at 127 (quoting Donald Griffin's concerns about intense "antagonism of
many scientists to suggestions that animals may have conscious experiences").
73. See id. at 124, 127. Other sources Wise cites as arguing that animals are not con-
scious include STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, IF A LION COULD TALK: ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE AND
THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1998); PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE
184-93 (1992); Daniel C. Dennett, Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why, 62 Soc.
RES. 691 (1995).
74. WISE, supra note 18, at 129-30.
75. Id. at 129.
76. Id. at 128; THE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY (N.S. Sutherland
ed., 1989).
77. WISE, supra note 19, at 86.
78. Id. at 129. In fact, Wise enthusiastically asserts that "it won't take much to push
[dogs] to 0.70." Id.
79. Id. at 112.
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sus about animal consciousness and autonomy. Fetuses aside, defining a
human "person" is at present probably viewed as a fairly straightforward
undertaking for courts; the more uncertainty and complexity would be
required to expand the definition to some nonhumans, the less likely
courts will be to undertake the leap.
B. THE "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE"
Drawing the Line seeks to buttress its "Scale of Practical Autonomy"
by arguing that courts should follow what it calls "the precautionary prin-
ciple."' 80 The book borrows the precautionary principle from environ-
mental policymakers. In that context, the precautionary principle
represents an approach urging that if we are uncertain whether some-
thing will cause harm to the environment, we should make decisions with
the assumption that it will harm the environment. 81 Drawing the Line
asserts that "the precautionary principle rejects science 'as the absolute
guide for the environmental policy maker,"' instead encouraging regula-
tors to "'act in anticipation of possible environmental harm to ensure that
this harm does not occur.'"82 The book asserts that the precautionary
principle is finding a home in America, German, British, Australian, and
European law.83
The attraction to animal rights activists of applying the precautionary
principle to the question of whether animals have practical autonomy is
obvious. It might allow an extension of rights to relatively intelligent ani-
mals even though we are uncertain of the extent to which they share char-
acteristics with humans that arguably form the basis for rights. Even
though we cannot know for certain how similarly to humans relatively
intelligent animals possess practical autonomy, Drawing the Line would
like to use the precautionary principle to afford them dignity rights be-
cause we cannot be certain of the degree to which they possess practical
autonomy.84
Drawing the Line provides an example of how it would like courts to
use the precautionary principle in its discussion of African grey parrots. 8
5
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id. at 39. A number of environmental scientists have analyzed and advocated the
use of the precautionary principle in policymaking. See, e.g., David Appell, The New Un-
certainty Principle, Sci. AM., Jan. 2001, available at http://www.sciamdigital.com (follow
"archive" hyperlink to the "January 2001" issue hyperlink); Tim Lauck et al., Implementing
the Precautionary Principle in Fisheries Management Through Marine Reserves, 8 ECOLOG-
ICAL APPLICATIONS S72 (Supp. 1998), available at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1051-0761
%28199802%298%3A1%3CS72%3AITPPIF%3E.
82. WISE, supra note 19, at 39.
83. Id. at 40. In fact, the precautionary principle appears to have influenced the crea-
tion of some national and international environmental policies and legislation. See, e.g.,
Marine Mammals Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1374 (1972) (prohibits any taking of marine
mammals that could be disadvantageous to the species); World Charter for Nature, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/37/7 art. 11/b (Oct. 28, 1982) (an activity that may impact nature is prohibited
if its "potential adverse effects are not fully understood").
84. WISE, supra note 19, at 35-47.
85. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, the book assigns an "autonomy value" of 0.78 to an Afri-
can grey parrot on its scale of practical autonomy. 86 It then argues that
"this entitles [the African grey parrot being discussed] to dignity rights
under a moderate reading of the precautionary principle. '87 In other
words, we cannot be certain whether particular African grey parrots are
self-aware and conscious, but significant evidence of this possibility exists
so let us consider giving them the benefit of the doubt.
Courts are, appropriately, unlikely to adopt this approach anytime
soon. Rather than being a guiding principle of our legal system, the pre-
cautionary principle is directly contrary to the manner in which courts
generally address novel arguments such as the thesis that dignity rights
should be extended to animals. Drawing the Line asserts that "[blecause
it appears likely that many, perhaps most, mammals and birds have emo-
tions, are conscious, and have selves, the burden of proving at trial that
an individual mammal or bird lacks practical autonomy should be
shouldered by the one who wants to harm them. ' 88 However, courts gen-
erally operate in precisely the opposite direction. Rather than presuming
that arguments are correct unless disproven, courts typically apply the
burden of persuasion to those seeking to establish facts or to change the
status quo.89 The more novel and disruptive to the status quo the asser-
tion, the stronger the burden of persuasion will likely be on those seeking
the change.90 Courts tend to presume that existing paradigms that have
stood the test of time make sense and should continue to be applied un-
less a party challenging the paradigm offers convincing proof that change
is needed.91 Presuming that a paradigm should be changed whenever
challenged if the existing paradigm might cause harm to some interest
would invite chaos, to say the least.
Courts do not require parties to establish absolute certainty of harm
when initiating litigation in order to obtain a ruling in their favor, but
they typically at least require harm to be shown more likely than not to
exist. In some contexts they require liability to be shown by "clear and
convincing" evidence or even, in criminal cases, guilt must be established
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.92 Given the dramatic, society-shak-
86. Id.
87. WISE, supra note 19, at 112.
88. Id. at 43. Wise argues that the precautionary principle should be applied to pre-
sume that any animal "with an autonomy value higher than 0.70" possesses practical auton-
omy for basic liberty rights. Id.
89. For example, both federal and state courts tend to assign the burden of proof to
the party trying to prove something new. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 60 (1991) ("[H]istory creates a strong presumption of continued validity .... );
Wilson v. State, No. 09-05-232 CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2495, at *7 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont Mar. 29, 2006, no pet.) (citing Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) ("While an appellant may make a novel or unique argument for which there is no
authority directly on point, he must ground his contention in analogous case law or provide
the reviewing court with the relevant jurisprudential framework for evaluating his claim.").
90. See supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. Under California law, punitive damages may be awarded to a plaintiff who pro-
vides "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant acted with "oppression, fraud or
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ing implications of assigning personhood and rights to some animals,,
courts would likely in practice make the burden of persuasion high
indeed.
Further, establishing harm to the interests of the party seeking a
change is only part of the equation. As addressed below, rights are not
absolute, and do not exist in a vacuum. 93 Assigning rights to one party
creates obligations for other parties. Courts would need to consider the
societal costs and policy implications that an assignment of new rights
would create in deciding whether to grant the rights. As one of many
potential examples, courts would need to consider the loss of life-saving
and other medical advances benefiting both humans and animals that are
attained through the use of animals in research laboratories along with
the interests of the research animals in obtaining a new right. 94 In light of
the considerations addressed above, most courts will not apply a precau-
tionary principle to the question of whether some animals are conscious.
C. PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN, INCOMPETENT
ADULTS, AND THINGS SUCH AS CORPORATIONS AND SHIPS
Both Rattling the Cage and Drawing the Line emphasize that despite all
of the attention devoted by animal rights' detractors to the primacy of
humans over animals, precedent exists for granting legal capacity to sue95
and legal rights to humans who are not legally competent and to other
entities that are not even sentient.96 Human children, even as infants or
fetuses, are granted rights under the Constitution. 97 The same is true for
malice," each of which indicate that, in performing the harmful act, the defendant acted
consciously or intentionally. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a), (c)(1)-(3) (West 1987). See, e.g.,
Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 69 (Cal. 2005) (plaintiff awarded puni-
tive damages based on clear and convincing evidence that defendant financial institution
acted fraudulently in a real estate transaction between the parties).
93. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
94. See generally FOUNDATION FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, THE PROUD ACHIEVE-
MENTS OF ANIMAL RESEARCH, http://www.fbresearch.org/Education/pdf/ProudAchieve
.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (listing medical arenas in which animal research has been
vital); New Jersey Association for Biomedical Research, Medical Milestones, http://www
.njabr.org/programs/medicalmilestones (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (timeline of medical
advancements completed with the use of animal research).
95. Capacity to sue, a crucial prerequisite to any effort to assert rights, is the ability of
a party to bring a dispute before a court. Although some courts have allowed animals to be
named as parties in lawsuits where such standing was not challenged, courts have rejected
allowing animals to be named as direct parties in legal actions where challenged by the
opposing party. See WISE, supra note 18, at 83; WISE, supra note 19, at 217.
96. See WISE, supra note 18, at 83; WISE, supra note 19, at 217.
97. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 23 (2006) ("A child is entitled to all of the protection that the
law affords every human being .... ). See, e.g., State v. Henry, 434 P.2d 692, 693 (N.M.
1967) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)) (twenty-two-day delay in bringing juvenile
armed robbery defendant before judge insufficient to overturn his conviction, since the
delay did not prevent him from receiving a fair trial and "the same constitutional standards
apply to juveniles as to adults." ); In re James Rich, 86 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1949) (citing People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932)) (domestic relations
court judge refused to charge the 15-year-old defendant as an adult because defendant's
doubtfully truthful story of having acted in self-defense was insufficient to prove defen-
dant's guilt of premeditated homicide or manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt).
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adults who are mentally ill or mentally retarded. 98 Rattling the Cage cor-
rectly points out that many great apes function at a much higher level of
intelligence and communication than infant children or many mentally
incompetent adults.99 Thus, the book argues, if rights are assigned to in-
fants and incompetent adults, they should also be assigned to great apes
functioning at a higher level. 100
This argument has a powerful intuitive appeal. The position that we
must draw a sharp line between legal personhood for humans and ani-
mals seems less compelling when we are reminded that humans with less
intellectual, emotive, and communicative ability than many animals re-
ceive these rights. The wind is taken from the sails of the sharp line argu-
ment even more effectively when considering that even ships and
corporations are granted personhood in civil litigation.' 0 ' If these
nonthinking, nonfeeling, lifeless things are granted legal personhood for
some purposes, one might wonder just how sacred legal personhood can
be. There is surface attractiveness to the argument that a living, thinking,
communicating, feeling animal should have an even better case for per-
sonhood than does a permanently unconscious human being or, even
more so, a lifeless thing.
Rattling the Cage uses the rights status of children and incompetent
adults to illustrate that rights exist on a scale, and that personhood may
be granted without granting all forms of rights.10 2 For example, children
and incompetent adults do not have the right to vote or to hold political
office. 10 3 Rattling the Cage states that "as their autonomies approach the
98. See, e.g., Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv. v. Kirkendall, 841 F. Supp. 796 (D. Mich.
1993) (discussing the constitutional right to bear children of a mentally disabled woman);
People v. Reliford, 382 N.E.2d 72, 76 (I11. App. Ct. 1978) ("[M]entally retarded individuals
possess the same rights as other individuals."). See also WISE, supra note 18, at 244-57;
WISE, supra note 19, at 44, 237-38. For a brief discussion of standing, see infra Part ILI.A.
Wise notes that the Louisiana legislature has even granted personhood and rights to a
fertilized in vitro ovum before it is implanted in a womb. WISE, supra note 18, at 237.
99. See WISE, supra note 18, at 185 ("[C]himpanzees were shown a Lilliputian can of
soda hidden in a scale model of a real room with which they were familiar. Unlike most
three-year old children, the chimpanzees were able to go straight to the real can of soda
hidden in the real room."); id. at 186 ("Sarah [the chimpanzee] could sort small bells and
cars as well as children" between three and one-half and five and one-half years old.);
WISE, supra note 19, at 236 (arguing that Koko, one of the world's only two signing goril-
las, "scores between 70 and 95 on standard human child intelligence tests").
100. See WISE, supra note 18, at 185.
101. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886) (establishing
that corporations are to be considered persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
102. See WISE, supra note 18, at 256.
103. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI ("The right of citizens... who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged.., on account of age.") (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2005) ("the Georgia Constitution lists only two grounds for denying a Georgia citizen who
is registered to vote the right to vote . . .(2) having a judicial determination of being
mentally incompetent to vote"). See generally Wikipedia, Election, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Election (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) ("The electorate does not generally include the
entire population; for example, many countries prohibit those judged mentally incompe-
tent from voting, and all jurisdictions require a minimum age for voting.").
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minimum, the scope of their fundamental rights may be varied propor-
tionately."'10 4 Wise would like for courts to take the same approach to
animals, allowing them basic dignity rights if they have practical auton-
omy, but not necessarily allowing them "full" rights such as the right to
vote, hold office, marry, engage in political speech, and so forth.10 5
Despite the intuitive appeal of pointing out that some rights are af-
forded to children, incompetent adults, corporations, and ships, impor-
tant distinctions exist. Regarding corporations and ships, personhood
was created as a legal fiction because courts found doing so to be effica-
cious in conducting and regulating business transactions and practices. 10 6
No great societal upheavals or challenges accompanied courts' pretense
that these entities could be thought as legal persons for some purposes.
Corporations are legal concentrations of the energies and efforts of
humans (shareholders and employees), and assigning them personhood is
a device to indirectly facilitate and control the combined efforts of
humans.
1 07
Similarly, ships are owned by humans for profit or pleasure, and the
legal fiction of assigning them personhood is a proxy for the human or
humans who control them.' 08 Ships and corporations do not assert the
dignity rights that Rattling the Cage and Drawing the Line would assign to
animals, such as the right to be free from slavery or a right of bodily
integrity, and pretending that ships and corporations are "persons" does
not create the enormous societal implications that would a finding that
some animals may not be "enslaved" or have their bodies used without
their consent.
Regarding children and incompetent adults, one may argue that the
potential for full autonomy they represent as humans distinguishes them
from all animals, even if some animals may surpass their intellectual,
104. WISE, supra note 18, at 256.
105. Id. ("To the extent that any of the Language Research Center apes .. lack the
autonomy necessary to entitle them to liberty rights in full, they should be given fewer
rights than one whose autonomy is sufficient, if humans who lack minimum autonomy are
given these rights.").
106. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)("[I]ncorporation's basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obli-
gations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created
it, who own it, or whom it employs."); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming
Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 688 (4th Cir. 1976); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 46 (2006) ("The
doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity existing separate and apart from the persons
composing it is a legal theory introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the
ends of justice.").
107. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945); Hutchinson v. Chase
& Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
108. See Na Iwi 0 Na Kapuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397, 1407 (D. Haw.
1995) (noting that "inanimate entities such as ships and corporations are accorded standing
in their own right, but these forms of standing are legal fictions created for the benefit of
living members of society"); Todd Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Anal-
ysis of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 Duo. L. REv. 77, 77 (2001) (discussing the
history of "the United States Supreme Court endors[ing] the judicially-created in rem per-
sonification fiction of the 'guilty object"'). See also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827)
(seminal case affording personhood to a ship).
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emotive, and communicative ability. As Rattling the Cage and Drawing
the Line acknowledge, religious and societal values and assumptions play
a large role in this response's appeal.' 0 9 Most Americans probably be-
lieve that humans are uniquely sacred. An infant, while perhaps not pos-
sessing consciousness at one stage of its life, may grow up to become the
next Einstein or Ghandi or may develop a cure for cancer. Even a person
in a permanent vegetative state, with no hope of recovery, is tied to other
humans more closely by their emotions and by societal and religious val-
ues than is an intelligent animal. Courts assign dignity rights to this un-
fortunate human because she is a human, and most other humans feel a
bond of sameness with her stronger than any bond of sameness they
might feel with the most intelligent of animals. 110
A related criticism that may be made regarding the books' focus on
consciousness as the primary basis for personhood is that, based on that
standard, even computers demonstrating artificial intelligence may one
day need to be granted personhood status and constitutional rights. Wise
is clearly skeptical that computers might be able to attain consciousness
anytime soon. Prominent legal scholar and judge Richard Posner takes
Wise to task for his unwillingness to seriously address the problem of
having to eventually grant personhood to computers on an analogous
basis."'
Rattling the Cage criticizes MIT professor Marvin Minsky, the "found-
ing father of artificial intelligence," as grossly overstating the possibility
that computers may attain consciousness in the foreseeable future."
2
Having to add computers into the mix when arguing for expansion of
rights complicates matters for those supporting animal rights. Assigning
rights and personhood to exceptionally powerful computers that are
programmed to attain a high level of artificial intelligence would likely
strike most Americans as untenable, 113 and recognizing that the argu-
ments for granting rights to computers are similar to the arguments for
109. WISE, supra note 18, at 262 (recognizing that "[a] judge's deepest cultural and
religious beliefs may disable even a Principle Judge from deciding according to principle.");
id. at 263-64; WISE, supra note 19, at 17-19, 22-23.
110. See generally Steven J. Bartlett, Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psy-
chological and Conceptual Blocks, 8 ANIMAL L. 143 (2002) (arguing that the dissolution of
long-standing human pathologies and beliefs about nonhuman animals is the road to
animal rights, not continual litigation or the establishment of a statutory scheme); Thomas
G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 539 (1998)
(claiming that "[m]any people who love and admire dogs" do so because they represent
benevolent human characteristics "including loyalty, trust, courage, playfulness, and
love"); David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Palacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals,
22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 752 (1995) ("[O]nce one dismisses innate human charac-
teristics, the ability to express reason, to recognize moral principles, to make subtle distinc-
tions, and to intellectualize-there is no way to support the view that humans possess
rights but animals do not.").
111. See Posner, supra note 30, at 531.
112. WISE, supra note 18, at 158.
113. The possibility of computers attaining consciousness has even been addressed
more than once in recent years by Hollywood, for example in the movies I, ROBOT (Fox
2004) and Al (Dreamworks 2001).
20071
SMU LAW REVIEW
granting rights to animals may weaken the appeal of assigning per-
sonhood to animals.
D. THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS AND PERSONHOOD FOR SLAVES,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN
Rattling the Cage focuses on three cases to illustrate the history of
equality and liberty rights. Two of the three cases involve slaves. This in
itself is not controversial, as the question of human slavery has given
United States courts their most significant opportunities to reflect upon
the nature of personhood and rights.'1 4 However, Rattling the Cage goes
far beyond looking to cases involving slavery merely for lessons on the
nature of rights. Rather, the book (and other writings by animal rights
activists) makes close and pronounced parallels between societal and le-
gal evolution away from slavery and the proposed evolution of rights for
some animals. In addition to helping to understand the sense of righteous
zeal possessed by many animal rights activists (that is, unless they are
engaged in lawless violence, we would not consider someone who is pas-
sionate about the evils of human slavery as an extremist), this provides
one of the central questions in the debate over animal rights: are the par-
allels between intelligent animals and slaves close enough to use the legal
evolution of rights for slaves as the blueprint for evolving rights for some
animals?
The two cases involving slavery that Wise describes as setting the stage
for his theory of animal personhood" 5 are Somerset v. Stewart 16 and
Dred Scott v. Sandford.117 Somerset is a well-known English case from
1772. It involved James Somerset, a slave captured in Africa and sold in
Virginia in 1749.118 In 1769, Somerset's owner traveled to England,
bringing Somerset with him.'1 9 Somerset escaped in England but was
captured and imprisoned until he could be sailed back to Jamaica and
sold.' 20 However, English abolitionists petitioned the King's Bench for a
writ of habeas corpus seeking to have slavery declared illegal and Somer-
set freed.121 To the delight of present animal rights activists-but also
identifying a foundation for a negative response to pleas for animal
114. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 394 (1857) (federal court did not have juris-
diction over a case in which plaintiff slave sued his owner for assault; since slaves were not
considered to be U.S. citizens, they lacked the right to bring suit in a U.S. court); Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 540 (1842) (any state law that classified slaves as property could
not be nullified by a contradictory law in another state); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449,
450 (1841) (Mississippi law forbidding import of slaves for sale into the state after a certain
date could not be used to nullify a contract, entered into in Louisiana and legal under
Louisiana law, for the sale of slaves).
115. WISE, supra note 18, at 49.
116. 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
117. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
118. William M. Wiecek, Somerset. Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the
Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 86, 101 (1974).





rights-Somerset's lawyer used an analogy to property ownership of ani-
mals in his argument that Somerset should have personhood and rights.
At a preliminary hearing, he questioned "upon what principle is it-can a
man become a dog for another man?" 122
The King's Bench used this case to prohibit slavery in England (al-
though it was of course still allowed in the colonies). 23 The court's deci-
sion was influenced strongly by notions of natural law-the idea that
moral absolutes exist and at a basic level are apparent to humans and that
the role of the courts is to correctly identify and follow natural law rather
than contradicting the natural moral order. 124
In a passage quoted in Rattling the Cage, the Somerset court relied on
basic moral imperatives to reject the arguments of Somerset's owner and
to ban slavery:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only by positive
law ... it's so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from a
decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of
England; and therefore the black must be discharged. 125
For Wise, a key aspect of this reasoning is that a sufficiently strong
moral imperative outweighs practical concerns (the ruling being made de-
spite "whatever inconveniences .. .may follow"). 126 The economic up-
heaval societal leaders knew would be caused by banning human slavery
was, without doubt, the strongest reason that it lasted as long as it did in
the United States.1 27 Of course, one of the strongest practical arguments
against rights for animals is that assigning them rights would cause enor-
122. See id. at 90. (quoting the transcript of oral argument in Somerset).
123. See Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772).
124. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1980) ("There is (i) a
set of basic practical principles ... and (ii) a set of basic methodological requirements of
practical reasonableness ... [which] provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts
that ... are reasonable-all-things-considered ... and acts that are unreasonable-all-things-
considered,.., thus enabling one to formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards."). See
generally CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY
WE NEED IT (1999). Natural law is contrasted with positive law, which represents the
relativist notion that laws are whatever humans declare them to be. See Kent Greenawalt,
Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 1, 2 (1996) (defining legal positivism as "the proposi-
tion that human law was what human beings had posited, that immoral laws counted as
'law,' and that there was no 'necessary connection' between law and morals"). See gener-
ally ANTHONY J. SEBOK ET AL., LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)
(outlining the origins and history of legal positivism and discussing the effects of various
courts on the theory). As a simple illustration, adherents of natural law would say that
murder must be illegal because murder is, by its nature, evil. Legal positivists would say
murder is illegal because human society has decided it is useful to hold murder to be
illegal.
125. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
126. WISE, supra note 18, at 50.
127. See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD (2006).
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mous economic and societal disruption. 128 By focusing on a natural law
moral imperative, Rattling the Cage seeks to argue that assigning rights
for some animals is necessary and that our history with slavery illustrates
this.
The Dred Scott case, known better than Somerset to Americans, in-
volved a slave named Dred Scott, whose master, Dr. John Emerson, was
an Army surgeon. 129 Because of his Army career, Dr. Emerson moved to
different posts in the 1830s several times, taking Mr. Scott with him. 130
Their residences included forts in the Illinois territory and the Missouri
territory. 13' The Scotts filed petitions in federal court arguing that they
should be released from slavery since they had resided in the Illinois ter-
ritory, which prohibited slavery. 132
The United States Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case,
made at a time of enormous national tension shortly before the outbreak
of the Civil War, is a model of racist ignominy, and it remains a source of
shame in our history. Like Somerset, the Dred Scott Court seemed at-
tracted to the concept of natural law, but with a much different interpre-
tation of natural justice. Chief Justice Roger Taney declared blacks to
have been found to be "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit
to associate with the white race."'1 33 Because of this natural order, blacks
could be "treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, when-
ever a profit could be made by it.' 134 On this basis, the Court rejected
Mr. Scott's legal personhood, and held that as property he had no stand-
ing to bring a legal action.135
Rattling the Cage uses Somerset to illustrate its vision of an enlightened
use of legal process to create (or, more accurately from Wise's perspec-
tive, to properly acknowledge) rights, and uses Dred Scott to illustrate the
backward legal thinking Wise believes is presently holding courts back
from granting rights to intelligent animals. The final of the three primary
cases Wise uses to illustrate his concept of rights is Citizens to End
Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. New England Aquarium.136 This is
a case Wise litigated himself in the 1990s in which a dolphin named Kama
was named as a plaintiff in a lawsuit alleging violations of federal law in
the sale of the dolphin to the Navy. Wise finds a direct connection be-
tween the shameful reasoning of the court in Dred Scott and the decision
of a federal court in 1993 that Kama the dolphin was not a person and
128. See Schmahmann & Palacheck, supra note 110, at 759-61 (discussing potential
problems with the expansion of animal rights in the section titled "The Challenge to
Human Freedoms Posed by Animal Rights").
129. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1857).
130. Id. at 431.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 452-54.
133. Id. at 407.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 454.
136. Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New Eng. Aquarium, 836 F.
Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993).
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thus could not file a legal action: "One hundred and forty years later [af-
ter Dred Scott], another federal judge said that Kama had no legal capac-
ity either."'1 37
Other animal rights activists have also sought to use the evolution of
rights for women and for children as roadmaps for the evolution of rights
for animals. 138 In Anglo-American legal history, both women and chil-
dren were, until relatively recent times, viewed as property of husbands
and fathers in some contexts. 139 Feminist literature and thought, in par-
ticular, have been increasingly referenced in analyzing oppression and de-
nial of rights for animals. 140 The message repeated with all three
comparisons (slaves, women, and children) is that our concept of rights
evolves with time and shifting societal mores and values, and that over
time we will view our repression of animal rights to be shameful just as
our earlier repression of rights for oppressed humans was shameful.
III. ANIMAL PERSONHOOD, RIGHTS, AND
SOCIETAL INTERESTS
As noted above, no clear standard exists for determining when an en-
tity may be considered a person for purposes of asserting rights.14' This is
likely in large part because the answer has historically seemed too appar-
ent for serious discussion-a person is a human person. Even Somerset v.
Stewart, the well-known English case discussed above disallowing slavery,
relied on simple natural law notions of liberty and equality for humans
rather than a precisely articulated legal standard.142 Although some cre-
ations of humans, such as corporations, have been granted the capacity to
sue or be sued, they may be viewed as symbolic representations of the
137. WISE, supra note 18, at 61.
138. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Are Women Persons?, 3 ANIMAL L. 7 (1997) (using the
arguments of a colleague concerning animal rights to defend her position on women's
rights); Susan Finsen, Obstacles to Legal Rights for Animals: Can We Get There from
Here?, 3 ANIMAL L. i, iii (1997); Helena Silverstein, The Legal Status of Nonhuman Ani-
mals, 8 ANIMAL L. 1, 15 (2002)
([W]hat has happened over the years is that there have been a lot of strategic
and savvy people who have been able to use various notions like rights... to
move things forward and to have progress .... [W]e saw it with women's
rights. We saw it with children's rights and we're seeing it with animal rights
139. See generally Katrina M. Albright, The Extension of Legal Rights to Animals
Under a Caring Ethic: An Ecofeminist Exploration of Steven Wise's Rattling the Cage, 42
NAT. RESOURCES J. 915 (2002).
140. See, e.g., id; Derek W. St. Pierre, The Transition from Property to People: The Road
to Recognition of Rights for Non-Human Animals, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 255 (1998).
In the fall of 2005 the author taught a course called Animal Law Seminar, and on the first
day of class I asked all of my students to share what interested them in enrolling in the
course. Two of my twenty-three students indicated that they were inspired to support rights
for animals by undergraduate courses they had taken comparing the historic oppression of
women and animals.
141. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.




interests of humans, and thus as extensions of humans. 14 3
Animals are, of course, not extensions of humans. Thus, efforts to ex-
tend personhood to animals have centered on highlighting as many attrib-
utes as possible that they share with humans. If some animals are smarter
than some humans, more capable of feeling emotions than some humans,
better communicators than some humans, and more conscious than some
humans, the argument goes, it is unjust to assign personhood to all
humans but not to intelligent animals. 144 Assuming that courts were
some day to accept this argument, a specific legal mechanism where it
might initially be manifest is the doctrine of standing.
A. PERSONHOOD AND LEGAL STANDING
Courts must find standing before considering substantive rights argu-
ments on the merits. Because of this, the first, and perhaps most decisive,
struggle in the direct battle' 45 for animal rights may be fought over capac-
ity to sue. At present, if a person representing that she is acting on behalf
of a research lab chimpanzee were to file a lawsuit in the chimp's name
claiming, for example, that the chimp was being subjected to slavery in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the court would likely reject the
claim on the basis of lack of standing to sue for the chimp rather than
needing to address the substantive constitutional claim.1 46
143. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
144. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 12, at 82-87 ("Do (Should) Animals Have Rights?").
See also WISE, supra note 18, at 251-57; Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and Woman's Best
Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 66
(2002) ("[Alnimals do not have many of the abilities that the average human possesses.
The fact that most people do not view humans without these abilities as somehow lacking
inherent value is the beginning of the analysis that can extend [personhood] status to ani-
mals."); Megan A. Senatori, The Second Revolution: The Diverging Paths of Animal Activ-
ism and Environmental Law 8 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 37 (2002)
(We deny the personhood of animals because we claim that animals have
certain 'defects,' such as the inability to use language or a supposedly inferior
intelligence, that permit us to treat them instrumentally, as means to our
ends. But there is simply no such 'defect' that is possessed by animals that is
not also possessed by some group of human beings.);
Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 14, at 1363 ("The capacity to suffer is . . .a
sufficient basis for legal rights for animals."); Tribe, supra note 15, at 7 ("[lIt is obscene and
evil to treat [animals] as things that anyone can really own."); Jens David Ohlin, Note, Is
the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 220
(2005) ("Several theorists have suggested that some animals meet most criteria for per-
sonhood and are therefore deserving of basic human rights.").
145. As contrasted with the stepping stone battles, such as eroding animals' property
status in tort claims, addressed above.
146. Standing for animals and standing for humans seeking to assert claims on behalf of
animals has been a favorite topic of animal rights scholarship. See, e.g., Joshua E. Gardner,
At the Intersection of Constitutional Standing, Congressional Citizen-Suits, and the Humane
Treatment of Animals: Proposals to Strengthen the Animal Welfare Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 330, 359-60 (2000) (arguing for extension of standing under the Animal Welfare Act);
Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing Under the
Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 817-20 (1997) (analyzing, among
other things, potential standing for "pet consumers"); Fiona M. St. John-Parsons, "Four
Legs Good, Two Legs Bad": The Issue of Standing in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Glickman and Its Implications for the Animal Rights Movement, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 895,
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Provided that a case or controversy is found to exist, Congress may
legislatively grant standing in the federal courts to any entity it wishes. 147
It may be that a court would find the Constitution's case or controversy
requirement to prevent standing for an animal in any context.148 How-
ever, it seems likelier that the courts would allow Congress to permit
standing for direct enforcement of legislation such as the Animal Welfare
Act if Congress chose to do so. 149
Standing to assert constitutional rights, as opposed to enforcement of
legislation, is another matter. Although many of the cases he addresses
involve federal constitutional rights questions. Wise ultimately argues for
rights under the common law. 150 However, other animal rights support-
ers have not shied away from seeking direct rights under the federal con-
stitution. For example, the Seton Hall Law Constitutional Law Journal
published a sample legal brief in 2000 that provides insights into the types
of constitutional claims that may be raised when lawsuits make direct
constitutional challenges rather than focusing on "stepping stone" issues.
This sample legal brief is entitle The Case of Evelyn Hart.151 Evelyn Hart
is the name of a fictitious chimpanzee bringing a constitutional claim in
her own name through a guardian ad litem. In addition to arguing for
personhood, the sample brief argues that using the chimp for scientific
experiments violates the chimp's constitutional rights under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amend-
ments, the Eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and the Thirteenth amendment's prohibition of slavery. The key to
an animal's standing to make constitutional slavery, due process, or equal
protection claims is, as the Evelyn Hart brief recognizes, the question of
personhood. Thus, the personhood debate at the center of the struggle
for animal rights may find a prominent battlefield in the legal context of
adjudicating constitutional standing. 152
933 (1999) (arguing that the Glickman decision may lead to direct standing for animals);
William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunc-
tions: the North Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39, 61 (2005) (arguing that North Car-
olina law allowing standing for humans to litigate anti-cruelty statutes despite not owning
or possessing the animals involved should be a model for other states); Varu Chilakamarri,
Comment, Taxpayer Standing: A Step Toward Animal-Centric Litigation, 10 ANIMAL L.
251, 264-70 (2004) (arguing for expanded use of taxpayer standing for humans to defend
animals' interests); Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing
of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 192-97 (2001) (arguing that animals
should be permitted direct standing under the Animal Welfare Act); Jonathan Krieger,
Emotions and Standing for Animal Advocates After ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum &
Bailey Circus, 22 LAW & INEQ. 385, 402-05 (2004) (arguing that humans should have stand-
ing to sue for animal welfare based on emotional injury to humans).
147. See Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 14, at 1359.
148. See id. at 1360.
149. See id.
150. See Wise, supra note 18, at 257-61.
151. Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, The Case of Evelyn Hart, 11 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 1 (2000).
152. For a recent denunciation of animal rights activists' efforts to attain standing for
animals, see Matthew Armstrong, Note, Cetacean Community v. Bush: The False Hope of
Animal Rights Lingers On, 12 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 185 (2006).
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The seminal case of Roe v. Wade153 provides an interesting discussion
of personhood that will doubtlessly receive attention in any constitutional
litigation over rights for animals. The Court in that case held that the
government cannot interfere with a woman's privacy right of autonomy
over her body absent a compelling government interest. 154 The govern-
ment had argued that a fetus is a "person" entitled to rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that protecting the life of this person is a
compelling interest. 155 Noting that "[t]he Constitution does not define
'person' in so many words," the Court analyzed each use of the word
"person" in the Constitution and found that in almost every instance "the
use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally." 156 Thus,
the court concluded that the word person in the Constitution does not
include the unborn. 157 Although, of course, animals for whom constitu-
tional rights are sought are born rather than unborn, Roe's analysis and
restrictive interpretation of the word "person" likely will be useful to
those opposing the extension of rights to animals both in disputes over
legal standing and on other battlegrounds of what will doubtlessly be a
protracted war over animals' property status.
B. RIGHTS IN COMPETITION
Recognizing personhood and rights for animals in standing claims or in
any other legal context would generate deep and lasting moral and socie-
tal challenges. An intellectual foundation for opposing the assignment of
personhood and thus rights to animals is based on recognizing that all
rights exist in competition with other rights.158 Rights are not free; as-
signing new rights may entail significant societal costs and may signifi-
cantly impair existing rights. 159 Were this not so, rights would be an
153. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
154. Id. at 155.
155. Id. at 156.
156. Id. at 157.
157. Id. at 158.
158. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: The Impoverishment of Political Dis-
course 15 (1991) (noting that discussions of rights should "keep competing rights and re-
sponsibilities in view, helping to assure that none would achieve undue prominence and
that none would be unduly obscured"); Harold W. Hannah, Animals as Property Changing
Concepts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 571, 576 (2001) (noting that if they were granted, "lalnimal
rights would not be co-existent with human RIGHTS, THEY WOULD BE IN COMPETITION with
each other"); Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1006 (1994)
(discussing, among other things, "the relation a given right should have to other rights and
interests ...and what effects a given right can be expected to have on the setting of
conditions for the durable protection of freedom and human dignity").
159. See Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern
Europe - And for the United States 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1996)
(Legal RIGHTS ARE NOT FREE goods, unless society is willing to let them re-
main purely aspirational, paper rights. The enforcement of legal rights con-
sumes real resources, including ... indirect costs to the extent that rights are
enforceable against socially productive activities, or impose socially burden-
some duties, or protect socially harmful activities.);
Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What's Wrong with This Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes
with Artistic Expression 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 880 (1997)
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unmitigated good, and should be assigned as freely and as broadly as
possible.160
As a simple and pertinent illustration, recognizing a constitutional right
in a chimpanzee to be free of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment
would destroy currently recognized property rights (for example, an HIV
research laboratory's "property" interest in its chimpanzee). It would
also restrict the First Amendment expression rights of scientists to engage
in important animal research. 161 Beyond the costs to other constitutional
rights, it would incur significant-perhaps disastrous-costs to society in
the loss of potential medical advances that will relieve suffering and death
for both humans and animals. The abortion debate provides another
vivid illustration. In that context, claims for fetus' right to life are in com-
petition with women's claims to autonomy rights over their bodies.162
Thus, any debate over animal rights of necessity must include consider-
ation of what specific rights are being sought and at what cost to compet-
ing rights and to society in general. Rattling the Cage's approach of
limiting claims to particularly intelligent animals and seeking only limited
rights for those intelligent animals reflects a recognition of this prob-
lem. 163 The more limited the rights Rattling the Cage seeks, the less the
societal cost accepting its arguments would entail. However, even pro-
viding limited rights to a limited range of animals challenges the sanctity
and primacy of human rights.
Taking away the uniqueness and sanctity of humanity even through the
establishment of limited "human" rights for some animals is a threat to
humanity. The philosopher A. M. MacIver asserts that, rather than im-
proving the lot of animals, recognition of animal rights would reflect a
fundamental shift in how we value human life and human rights, making
both less precious: "The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow
men, because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to
treat the brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason why
we should not treat human beings like brutes. '164
("Intellectual property RIGHTS ARE NOT FREE; they are imposed at the expense of future
creators and the public at large.").
160. See GLENDON, supra note 158, at 9 (referencing Plato's model of a completely free
society as a failed society); Posner, supra note 159, at 2 ("Some goods really are free, such
as air (if you're not too particular about its quality), and there is no need to worry about
trading them off against other goods. Legal rights are not free goods .... ").
161. Scientific research may be considered expressive activity protected under the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridge-
ments" of Scientific Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amend-
ment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979, 980 (2005); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the
Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Informa-
tion Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 249 (2004).
162. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
163. See WISE, supra note 18, at 251, 267.
164. A.M. MACIVER, Ethics and the Beetle, in ETHICs 527, 528 (Judith J. Thompson &




C. DIVORCING RIGHTS FROM RESPONSIBILITIES-REJECTING THE
SOCIAL COMPACT
The argument that humans must have primacy is supported not only by
concern that human suffering will ultimately increase if we begin viewing
ourselves on the same level as animals, but also by humans' ability to
exercise moral responsibility. Rights may be viewed as inextricably inter-
twined with moral responsibilities. 16 5 When chimpanzees viciously at-
tacked and mutilated a human visitor in a highly publicized incident in
California in 2005, no one blamed the chimps.166 They do not have rights
but, correspondingly, they do not have responsibilities in human soci-
ety.167 The search for responsibility appropriately centered on those with
the power to exercise rights with moral responsibility: the chimps' keep-
ers and even the assault victims. 168
Political scientists often describe human civilization and government as
grounded upon a "social compact" between citizens and government. 6 9
In exchange for being assured of valued rights1 70 and protection, humans
in effect agree to sacrifice some freedoms and to take on responsibilities
to others in their community and to their government. A powerful argu-
ment may be made that assigning rights to animals that do not possess
moral responsibility represents a rejection of the foundation of human
civilization.
In this regard, the argument for animal rights may be even less persua-
sive than arguments for "computer rights." The capacity to make smarter
and smarter computers remains dynamic, allowing at least the argument
that they could some day develop consciousness and moral responsibility.
Even under the most hopeful scenario, absent millions of years of evolu-
tion or DNA manipulation, chimpanzees will never develop the moral
165. See GLENDON, supra note 158; Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Propter Honoris Respectum:
Forming an Agenda - Ethics and Legal Ethics, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 998 (2002)
(regarding the interrelation of a lawyer's duty to discuss both a client's legal rights and
moral responsibilities).
166. For a description of this incident, see Amanda Covarrubias & Hector Becerra, No
Charges Filed in Chimps' Attack, L.A. TIMES, April 21, 2005, at B1.
167. Humorist P.J. O'Rourke oversimplified this argument against animal rights but
provided an interesting perspective in writing: "Screw the rights of nature. Nature will
have rights as soon as it has duties. The minute we see birds, trees, bugs and squirrels
picking up litter, giving money to charity, and keeping an eye on our kids at the park, we'll
let them vote." P.J. O'Rourke, Save the Planet? We're All Going to Die Anyway, PROVI-
DENCE PHOENIX, Sept. 8, 1994, at 6.
168. See Covarrubias & Becerra, supra note 166.
169. See generally Robert B. Reich, What Happened to the American Social Compact?,
50 ME. L. REV. 1 (1998); Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681 (1997).
170. In this context, the concept of rights applies even in governments perceived as
failing to appropriately respect human rights. The most repressive of governments will fail
if its citizens conclude that the government cannot or will not provide them some level of
benefit or protection. Following the mass extinction of millions of Russians in World War
II, many citizens of the former Soviet Union were content to sacrifice the rights to free
speech and democratic elections because they most strongly valued the "right" to security
provided by their government-the social compact between government and the governed
applied even in a repressive regime that denied many basic human rights.
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responsibility that should be a prerequisite for establishing new rights in a
civilized society.171
One might argue that animals' interests may actually be best served by
emphasizing the centrality of human moral responsibility rather than
animal rights in debates over how animals are treated. 172 The higher one
places humans on a rights pedestal, the higher human recognition or ac-
ceptance of responsibility for moral choices must be. This relates to A.
M. Maclver's argument that assigning rights to animals would diminish
the sanctity and dignity of human life. 173 The cost to humans of receiving
rights is the heavy burden of responsibility, including responsibility for
preventing inappropriate treatment of socially powerless animals. 174
The status of children and incompetent adults must be raised again
when analyzing the relationship between rights and responsibilities.
Human society gives some rights to children and incompetent adults even
though in some instances they are incapable of exercising any moral re-
sponsibility at all (for example, an infant or an adult in a coma). As ad-
dressed above, children and incompetent adults are different from
animals in the potential for full consciousness and human autonomy that
they represent. 175 Even brain-dead humans who have no hope of recov-
ering consciousness are connected to other humans by the nonimpaired
humans' emotions and by societal and (for most Americans) religious val-
ues much more closely than are intelligent animals. 176
Abandoning blanket recognition of at least some rights for all humans
that are superior to what society recognizes for animals would entail im-
171. See M. TOKESHI, SPECIES COEXISTENCE: ECOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY PER-
SPECTIVES 22 (1999) ("[I1t was observed that the rate of DNA evolution was apparently
slow in primates and fast in rodents compared with other mammals.").
172. For an argument that animals' interests are best served by the property paradigm
rather than by a rights model, see Robert Garner, Political Ideology and the Legal Status of
Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 77 (2002). The contrasting "mainstream" animal rights position that
property status should be eliminated is illustrated by Thomas G. Kelch, supra note 110.
173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
174. See DANIEL BRENNAN ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 69 (2005) (considering corporate rights: "Sim-
ply put: with rights come responsibilities-a familiar but all too often ignored point.");
Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost: Individualism, Col-
lectivism and Conflict in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 237, 244 (2004)
("[B]ecause society grants rights, society may also expect something in return. Therefore,
with those socially granted RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES or obligations to the larger
community .. "); Bernard W. Bell, In Defense of Retroactive Laws, 78 TEX. L. REV. 235,
251 (1999) (reviewing DANIEL TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION (1998)) ("The principle
that an actor should pay for the harms caused by his activity can also be considered a moral
principle. With rights come responsibilities-one should not be able to claim the benefits
without also bearing corresponding burdens.").
175. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
176. See Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 480-83 (2004)
("[Tihe view that a brain-dead patient is deprived of rights or interests, and exists solely as
a corpse, referred to by Finnerty et al. as 'the cadaveric model,' is distressing. Such an
approach goes against most of our societal norms .... "). Sperling also cited certain princi-
ples, including "moral intuitions," "psychological inclinations," and "religious convictions,"




plications that society in its present state would not be willing to accept.
To expand upon a quote from Rattling the Cage noted above, 177 Wise
argues:
Human infants, young children, and the severely mentally retarded
or autistic who lack the autonomy necessary to entitle them to full
liberty rights are not totally denied them. Judges give them dignity-
rights, and even the right to choose, by using the legal fiction that
"all humans are autonomous." However, as their autonomies ap-
proach the minimum, the scope of their fundamental rights may be
varied proportionally. If so, equality demands that the rights of ani-
mals who possess the same degree of autonomy as these humans pos-
sess vary proportionally, too.178
If this argument were to prevail, we would have to be willing to accept
that some animals are entitled to rights superior to the rights of some
humans. A normal adult chimpanzee has a stronger argument for practi-
cal autonomy as defined by Wise than does a human infant or a comatose
or severely retarded human adult.179 Chimps have better demonstrated
reasoning ability, greater ability to communicate, and, at least in compari-
son to an unconscious human, greater emotive capability. 180 Society is
simply not prepared to value chimpanzees more highly than it values in-
fants or severely impaired adults, and noting this reality helps to highlight
the difficulties in the comparisons Rattling the Cage seeks to make.
IV. THE STEPPING STONE APPROACH
Mr. Wise's approach of seeking rights and personhood for intelligent
animals is not the only stepping stone being sought. Professor David
Favre, an animal law activist, 181 has expressed concerns that Wise's per-
sonhood approach is not sufficiently practical in the short term. He notes
that "Mr. Wise's writings do not suggest how to think about balancing
human and animal rights when they are in conflict. ' 182 A "significant
limitation" he sees with Wise's practical autonomy approach is that
"human characteristics become the measuring stick by which to judge the
177. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
178. WISE, supra note 18, at 256.
179. See W.C. McGREw, THE CULTURED CHIMPANZEE: REFLECTIONS ON CULTURAL
PRIMATOLOGY 71, 72 (2004) ("All four species-bonobo, gorilla, orangutan, and chimpan-
zee-show similar problem-solving abilities and facility at acquiring human systems of
communication ... [and] similar ability at mirror-image recognition, a cognitive capacity
that correlates with tool use."); HERBERT S. TERRACE, NIM 18 (1979) ("Whatever the na-
ture of the . . . gap that separates human and ape intelligence, its magnitude has been
reduced considerably by demonstrations that chimpanzees can learn extensive vocabu-
laries of arbitrary words."). See generally GEORGE PAGE, INSIDE THE ANIMAL MIND: A
GROUNDBREAKING EXPLORATION OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE (2001) (discussing the intel-
ligence of chimpanzees, as well as other animals).
180. See McGREw, supra note 179.
181. Favre, a Professor at Michigan State University College of Law, has published ex-
tensively on animal law issues, and he edits the Michigan State University College of Law
Animal Legal and Historical Web Center, http://www.animallaw.info/.
182. Favre, supra note 25, at 336.
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legal 'oughts' for animals."'1 83 Further, Favre correctly believes it is "un-
likely that the next movement in the legal system will be to grant any
absolute rights to a group or species of animals."'1 84 Instead, Favre thinks
that courts are likelier to begin taking animals' interests more seriously in
what he perceives to be a gradual approach-taking steps that represent
something less than a grant of personhood status, but something more
than the current legal paradigm.
Although Wise ultimately hopes for rights for some animals (and, if he
were "Chief Justice of the Universe," he might recognize rights for all
animals capable of suffering), 185 he also understands that this is not going
to come quickly. As addressed above, his books focus extensively on the
gradual evolution of the common law and "funeral by funeral" changes as
older judges die and younger judges with greater receptivity to emerging
ideas take their place. 186 Because of this, animal rights activists are fight-
ing numerous legal battles that do not directly go to the question of per-
sonhood and rights for animals, but rather would serve as important
stepping stones toward eventually achieving that ultimate objective.
The most intense of these related stepping stone battles at present is
over noneconomic damages in tort lawsuits brought by humans whose
companion animals were wrongfully killed. Courts in most jurisdictions
allow damage awards for the emotional distress suffered by a parent,
child or spouse when a loved one is negligently killed (for example, a
death caused by negligent operation of an automobile or medical mal-
practice).1 87 However, courts typically do not allow such damages when
a companion animal is negligently killed.188 Animals are viewed as prop-
erty under the law, and the law typically does not allow emotional distress
damages for property loss. 189 Rather, the measure of damages is the
animal's property value. Thus, the recovery available for the negligent




185. As noted above, Wise declares "If I were Chief Justice of the Universe, I might
make the simpler capacity to suffer, rather than practical autonomy, sufficient for per-
sonhood and dignity rights." WISE, supra note 19, at 34 and accompanying text. See also
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a parent may recover for the mental anguish caused by the death of a child); Smith v.
United States, 608 F. Supp. 1270, 1271-72 (D. Mass. 1985) (concluding that a parent was
entitled to recover for mental anguish and emotional pain and suffering); Adams v.
Hunter, 343 F. Supp. 1284, 1290-91 (D.S.C. 1972), affd, 471 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1973) (up-
holding an award for the parents' mental shock and suffering).
188. See Council Draft, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 46
cmt. j (2006) ("While pet animals are often quite different from chattels in terms of emo-
tional attachment, damages for emotional harm arising from negligence causing injury to a
pet are also not permitted.").
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Huss, supra note 144, at 89-103; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking Up the
Wrong Tree, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at 5.
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Animal rights activists have recognized that if courts or legislatures re-
ject the market value paradigm in these cases and instead treat pets in the
same way human children are treated-again, emotional distress dam-
ages are allowed to parents when their children are negligently killed-a
significant legal step will have been taken toward ultimately eradicating
animals' property status. Further, they recognize that they have in this
issue a potential opportunity to garner support from mainstream society.
No loving pet owner thinks of her or his pet as mere property like a chair
or a bicycle, and the idea that the wrongful death of a much-beloved but
nonpedigreed family dog could be "compensated" for less than $100
seems coldhearted and perhaps even offensive. 191
It is telling that Wise himself, although seeming to have a primary focus
on animal rights rather than specifically on tort law, is a prominent sup-
porter of these cases seeking expansion of emotional distress damages.
He is not shy about providing a reason for his strong interest in this area.
In a June 5, 2005 article in the Chicago Tribune, Wise was quoted as say-
ing that often the monetary damages are not the most important aspect of
animal-related cases.1 92 And to quote part of a March 6, 2005 article in
the Boston Globe discussing the views of Wise and other animal rights
activists, "Animal rights activists say they are laying the legal foundation
establishing that pets have intrinsic worth. Ultimately, says Steven Wise
... this foundation will support a ruling that animals are not property but
have rights of their own and thus legal standing. ' 19 3
Although not yet accepted by appellate courts, some lower courts have
begun awarding emotional distress damages for negligent killing of a pet.
Further, three states a9 4 have enacted statutes allowing damages beyond
market value in at least some circumstances, and legislation has been pro-
posed in at least seven other states.1 95 The American Veterinary Medical
Association views the issue as having serious ramifications, and recently
drafted an official policy position opposing efforts to expand such dam-
ages.1 96 The American Law Institute is recognizing the emergence of this
191. See Cupp, supra note 190.
192. William Hageman, Is Your Pet Entitled to His Day in Court? The Answer: Maybe.,
CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2005, at Q1.
193. Douglas Belkin, Animal Rights Gains Foothold as Law Career, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 6, 2005, at 6.
194. Tennessee, Maryland, and Illinois have enacted statutes allowing damages beyond
market value in at least some circumstances. See NAT'L Ass'N FOR BIOMEDICAL RE-
SEARCH ANIMAL LAW SECTION, NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES, available at http://www.nabr
.org/AnimalLaw/Damages/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (follow "Non-Economic
Damages" link on right).
195. Id. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Id.
196. In 2005, the author served as an advisor to the AVMA Task Force that formulated
the animal compensatory value policy position adopted by the AVMA, which reads as
follows:
The American Veterinary Medical Association recognizes and supports the
legal concept of animals as property. However, the AVMA recognizes that
some animals have value to their owners that may exceed the animal's mar-
ket value. In determining the real monetary value of the animal, the AVMA
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issue; a recent tentative draft of a section of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: General Principles directly addresses the problem and correctly
concludes that recovery is not appropriate. 197
In addition to focusing on the concern over helping to lay the ground-
work for assigning rights to animals, opponents of potential expansion
focus on numerous other concerns, including that allowing this expansion
would place human-animal relationships over most human-human rela-
tionships (under wrongful death statutes very close nonfamily relation-
ships, such as best friends or even fianc6s, are not allowed emotional
distress recovery), 198 and that allowing this expansion would make veteri-
nary services more expensive and less available to the poor, actually caus-
ing harm rather than benefit to animals needing medical care.199
Two other stepping stone battlefields that are receiving increasing at-
tention from animal rights activists are the movement to replace the con-
cept of pet ownership with pet "guardianship," and the movement to
treat pets more similarly to how human children are treated in marital
dissolution cases. Applying the concept of guardianship rather than own-
ership would, of course, be a step in the direction of eliminating property
status. 2°° Human parents are legal guardians, not owners, of human chil-
dren.20 1 At least thirteen cities and the state of Rhode Island have en-
acted ordinances and statutes changing ownership language to
believes the purchase price, age and health of the animal, breeding status,
pedigree, special training, veterinary expenses for the care of the animal's
injury or sickness, related to the incident in question, and any particular eco-
nomic utility the animal has to the owner should be considered. Any exten-
sion of available remedies beyond economic damages would be
inappropriate and ultimately harm animals. Therefore, the AVMA opposes
the potential recovery of non-economic damages.
American Veterinary Medical Association, Compensatory Values for Animals Beyond
Their Property Value (Nov. 2005), http://www.avma.org/issues/policy/compensatory-values
.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
197. Council Draft, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 46 cmt.
j (2006).
198. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Visitec, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (hold-
ing that the victim's girlfriend could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress for the death of a non-relative under Washington's Wrongful Death Statute); Kately
v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming dismissal of a claim
based on mental distress brought by victim's best friend because the best friend was not
related to the victim by blood or marriage).
199. See Cupp, supra note 190; see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veteri-
narians in the Doghouse: Are Pet Suits Economically Viable?, THE BRIEF, Spring 2002, at
48.
200. For an argument that a guardianship model would enhance animal protection
more effectively than eliminating the property paradigm, see David Favre, Integrating
Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87, 91 (2004). See also Tim Eigo,
Laws for Paws: A New Breed of Law Section, 42 ARIZ. ATr'Y 14, 18 (2005); Elizabeth
Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property Classification of
Companion Animals by Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 486-88 (2003); Joyce S. Tischler,
Comment, Rights for Nonhuman Animals: A Guardianship Model for Cats and Dogs, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 484, 500-06 (1977).
201. See Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: Implications for
Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1785 (1996) (explaining a
parent's ability to act as a guardian ad litem for their children because parents are the




In marital dissolution cases, pets are currently treated by most courts as
property. 20 3 If a divorcing couple cannot reach agreement on who should
have custody of a jointly owned pet, courts will sometimes threaten to
have the pet sold and the proceeds of the "property" sale divided be-
tween the spouses.2° 4 Animal rights activists are pushing to have courts
change the standard from property to a "best interest of the pet" ap-
proach, analogous to the "best interest of the child" approach used in
deciding custody for human children in divorce cases.20 5 Appreciating
how this approach, if adopted, would serve as another stepping stone to-
ward animal personhood, is not difficult.
V. SEEKING ANOTHER STEP: ANIMALS AS
TORT PLAINTIFFS
A. ANIMALS AS "INDIVIDUALS" IN TORT LAW INTEREST BALANCING
A New Tort,206 Professor David Favre's recent law review article, con-
tinues the search for stepping stones with an interesting proposal. In the
202. See National Association for Biomedical Research Animal Law Section, Owner-
ship vs. Guardianship, http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Guardianship/index.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2006).
There are fifteen cities, towns, and counties that have adopted an ordinance changing
the term "owner" to "guardian" in relation to pets, including Santa Clara, California;
Bloomington, Indiana; Saint Louis, Missouri; Albany, California; Wanaque, New Jersey;
Woodstock, New York; Marin County, California; Sebastopol, California; San Francisco,
California; Amherst, Massachusetts; Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin; Sherwood, Arkansas;
West Hollywood, California; Berkeley, California; and Boulder, Colorado. Id. The state of
Rhode Island also has incorporated this language into its constitution. Id.
203. See Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to
Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 195-97 (2003) (discussing the property
status of domesticated animals and pets); Eithne Mills & Keith Akers, "Who Gets the Cats.
. . You or Me?" Analyzing Contact and Residence Issues Regarding Pets upon Divorce or
Separation, 36 FAM. L.Q. 283, 286-87 (2002) (addressing the fact that courts consider pets
personal property).
204. See Sally Kalson, Pets Take Center Stage in Many Divorce Cases, FT. WAYNE J.
GAZETE, July 9, 2006, at 3D ("A circuit judge threatens to sell the animal and split the
proceeds between them if the two can't agree on visitation."). Usually this threat seems to
be effective in convincing the spouses to come to an agreement of some kind.
205. See Huss, supra note 203, at 226; id. at 307 (referencing the "best interests of the
animal" approach taken by a court in roommates' dispute over their cat); Dianna J. Gen-
try, Including Companion Animals in Protective Orders: Curtailing the Reach of Domestic
Violence, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 114-16 (2001) (examining animal abuse within the
context of domestic violence and suggesting a "best interest of the animal" test for resolv-
ing animal custody disputes). See also Brooke A. Masters, In Courtroom Tug of War Over
Custody, Roommate Wins the Kitty, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1997, at B1. In one case in
which a trial court decided to allow a "best interest of the pet" standard, a wealthy divorc-
ing couple spent approximately $150,000 in legal fees and expenses fighting over whether
their dog Gigi would be better off with the husband or the wife. See Quentin Letts, Fur
Better or Worse, LONDON SUN. TELEGRAPH, Feb. 16, 2003, at 21. One of the spouses hired
a film crew to make a "Day in the Life of Gigi" video to demonstrate how happy Gigi was
staying at the home of that spouse. See id. The other spouse hired an animal behaviorist to
analyze the dog in support of her contention that the dog was happier living with her. See
id. For obvious reasons, many animal rights activists would prefer not to highlight cases
such as these.
206. Favre, supra note 25.
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article, Favre takes a step beyond efforts to allow noneconomic damages
for owners of tortiously-killed animals. He suggests that a new tort cause
of action should be recognized in which animals themselves, represented
by humans appointed by the courts, are the plaintiffs. This section will
analyze A New Tort's proposal as illustrative of efforts to bend current
law to provide stepping stones for the erosion or elimination of animals'
property status.20 7
1. The Historical Basis for Torts Claims
Tort law is intensely human. It is the civil legal repository for the
countless conflicts between humans that are inevitable in civilized society.
As noted by Dean William Prosser, tort law addresses "the allocation of
losses arising out of human activities. '2 08 Its purpose may be described
as providing a societal balancing of interests between humans or human
institutions in conflict. Quoting Prosser again, "in short, to strike some
reasonable balance between the plaintiff's claim to protection against
damage and the defendant's claim to freedom of action for the defen-
dant's own ends, and those of society, occupies a very large part of the
tort opinions. '209
The essential humanity of tort law is so strongly imbedded in its nature
that commentators typically do not even bother to address the possibility
of applying it to entities unrelated to humans.2 10 Of course tort law may
involve corporations211 or government entities 212 as parties, but these in-
stitutions are human creations and merely represent aggregations of
human interests.21 3 Thus, considering their interests against those of an
207. Professor Favre is not alone in favoring expansion of tort law to advance the cause
of animal rights. See, e.g., Lauren Magnotti, Note, Pawing Open the Courthouse Doors:
Why Animals' Interests Should Matter When Courts Grant Standing, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
455, 482-83 (2006) (supporting expansion of emotional distress damages for death of pets
in argument that standing should be granted to animals).
208. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984).
209. Id.
210. Favre seems to acknowledge this in his article. When discussing the purpose of tort
law, he notes that "[m]uch of the footnoted materials use terms such as 'others' or 'per-
sons.' Most often the author does not specifically contemplate animals being included
under the umbrella of such terms." Favre, supra note 25, at 355 n.74.
211. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that corpo-
rations are granted legal personhood); Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 59 P. 304, 305
(Cal. 1899) (holding that the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to a
corporation).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941) (holding that the
United States is a juristic person with the capacity to sue on contracts made with it); Hoyt
v. Bd. of Civil Serv. Comm'rs of L.A., 132 P.2d 804, 806 (Cal. 1942) (holding that municipal
corporations are given power to sue and be sued by charter or statute).
213. Corporations are considered to be "singular entities" in terms of tort liability, even
though they are created by formally aggregating separate interests. See generally James A.
Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329 (2005). A
corporation is, therefore, a human creation with a distinct existence that "can be held re-
sponsible, both legally and morally, for [its) intentions, actions, and character." Susanna
M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the Character Evidence
Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 805-06 (2000). Many jurisdictions have
codified similar tort liability for government agencies, not allowing them to claim sovereign
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
opposing human (or even of an opposing corporation or government en-
tity) is very much an exercise in balancing human concerns.
Although tort scholars typically assume rather than explicitly empha-
size the exclusively human nature of tort law balancing, they often ascribe
purposes for the balancing that are uniquely human. For example, theo-
rists have emphasized preservation of moral freedom-a concept that en-
tails free will and moral responsibility-as a primary focus of tort law.
Professor Richard Wright, promoting the Kantian-Aristotelian concept of
justice as a basis of tort law, argues that tort law's goal is the
promotion of the equal (positive and negative) freedom of each indi-
vidual in the community. Embodied in this concept of the good is
the idea of the absolute moral worth of each human being as a free
and equal member of the community, with an equal entitlement to
the share of social resources and the security of currently held re-
sources needed to realize his or her humanity.214
Professor David Owen provides another illustration, writing that "[iln an
imperfect and dynamic world, accidental harm is inevitably entailed in
human freedom, such that conduct resulting in accidental harm may be
considered faulty only if it results from a choice to violate another per-
son's vested rights or the community's interests in utility. '215
The Kantian-Aristotelian focus on justice as a basis for tort law is often
described as a corrective justice model.216 In the past few decades, law
and economics scholars have articulated a deterrence model to compete
with the corrective justice model.217 Advocates of the deterrence model,
which does not have deep historical roots in tort law scholarship, 218 argue
that societal economic efficiency should be tort law's objective.219 How-
ever, even the upstart deterrence model (derided too harshly by one
scholar as a fad whose "novelty" has faded),220 although perceived as
cold and uncaring by some, is ultimately human. The utilitarian balancing
immunity from tort actions brought against them if a private actor would face liability in
the same situation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1997); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2002).
214. Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice & Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNATIONS
OF TORT LAW 181-82 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
215. David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF TORT LAW 228 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
216. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802-03 (1997).
217. See id. See generally GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29 (1972).
218. Schwartz, supra note 216, at 1804. When law and economics advocates began pro-
pounding their theories in the context of tort law, "[d]eterrence had not played a signifi-
cant role in traditional tort scholarship." Id.
219. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recur-
ring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990); Gordon Tullock, Negligence Again, 1 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 51 (1981).




of interests in a human society are of necessity human interests. Analyses
of interest balancing by deterrence-minded scholars focuses on human
needs and human desires in a world of scarce resources. 22 ' Although the
interests of corporations and governments may be included in the balanc-
ing, they are, as noted above, human creations and represent collective
human interests.222 Both from a corrective justice and from an economic
efficiency perspective, consideration of animals' interests in tort law must
inevitably be made from a human perspective in a society created, organ-
ized, and controlled by humans.
Dean Roscoe Pound listed five categories of fundamental human inter-
ests that provide the basis for law.223 They include the physical person,
freedom of will, honor and reputation, privacy and sensibilities, and belief
and opinion.224 The latter four of these five interests are uniquely
human. Few serious persons would ascribe free will, for example, with its
companion moral responsibility, to any animals. As noted above,22 5
when chimpanzees viciously attacked and mutilated a human visitor in a
highly publicized incident in California in 2005, no one blamed the
chimps. 226 Animals do not have rights but, correspondingly, they do not
have responsibilities in human society.2 27 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts applied an interest analysis specifically to tort law, which it also
described in uniquely human terms. It defined interests as denoting "the
object of any human desire. '228
2. The Proposed New Basis for Tort Claims Involving Animals as
Plaintiffs
A New Tort's proposed new tort claim would require finding a basis for
tort law radically different from its uniquely human foundation. The arti-
cle's first paragraph infers that animals are "individuals" and that, under
A New Tort's proposal, tort law would "do what it always has done" by
balancing the interests of individuals. 229 Accepting this premise, of
course, makes all the difference in the world regarding whether animals
should be allowed to bring tort lawsuits.
As noted above, tort law is uniquely human and has always been di-
221. See John C. P. Goldberg, Symposium: Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.
J. 513, 544-45 (2003) (explaining that economic deterrence theorists see the purpose of tort
law as supporting social welfare by deterring undesirable conduct).
222. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
223. 3 RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 33 (1959). Professor Favre relies heavily on
Dean Pound's emphasis on balancing interests in his proposal for a new tort. See Favre,
supra note 25, at 338-42.
224. POUND, supra note 223, at 33. Professor Favre cites these five interests. See Favre,
supra note 25, at 357 n.79.
225. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
226. See Covarrubias & Becerra, supra note 166, at B1.
227. See supra notes 165-174 and accompanying text.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (1965). Professor Favre also cites
this language. See Favre, supra note 25, at 359 n.17.
229. See Favre, supra note 25, at 334.
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rected at human conflicts.230 Animals are certainly individuals in a sense;
each animal has different characteristics, and few would challenge an as-
sertion that intelligent species of animals even have individual personali-
ties. However, the concept of an "individual" in legal analysis has always
applied to human individuals and their proxies (for example, corpora-
tions and government entities). Only humans possess the moral responsi-
bility and undisputed consciousness 231-in other words, personhood-
required by the tort system for status as a party to a lawsuit.
Indeed, allowing animals plaintiff status in tort lawsuits may be more of
a front door approach toward personhood than A New Tort concedes.
The article's thesis is that direct attempts at eliminating property status
are too bold given the current societal climate, and that allowing animals
to serve as tort plaintiffs would serve as a stepping stone toward change
while, at least for now, maintaining their property status.232 However,
given the intensely human nature of tort law, recognizing animals as
plaintiffs would in some respects be equivalent to making them persons.
The historically dominant view of tort law as moral balancing to maintain
human freedom by definition requires persons or their proxies to serve as
parties.233 Viewing the ascension of animals to plaintiff status as merely a
small stepping stone may underestimate the dramatic repudiation of the
basis of tort law that such a development would require. Rather than
making animals a bit more like persons, as far as tort law is concerned,
they would be given the moral status of persons.
A New Tort points to the creation of several types of laws protecting
animals as previous stepping stones making the transition to animals as
plaintiffs feasible. For example, the article argues that because anti-cru-
elty laws protect animals from mistreatment, they already appear to have
legal rights enforceable by the state.234 Currently, this "right" is only en-
forceable by the state, but A New Tort argues that the "logical next step"
is to evolve the government-enforced right into a personal right held by
animals.235 The government may have difficulty enforcing this right, and
allowing animals to enforce it themselves would "make the implementa-
tion of the duty more efficient. '236 This would "allow other resources,
neither politically nor economically limited, to support animals in assert-
ing their interests." 237
This analysis neglects some fundamental problems in comparing pro-
tection of animals under criminal animal welfare statutes to animals pro-
tecting their own welfare as tort plaintiffs with human representatives.
230. See supra Part notes 208-222 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 165-174 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the issues
surrounding consciousness in infants and incompetent adults, see supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text.
232. See Favre, supra note 25, at 352-53.
233. See supra notes 208-222 and accompanying text.
234. See Favre, supra note 25, at 341.
235. Id. at 355.




Criminal law's purpose is different from tort law's purpose. Criminal law
is not directed at creating rights for victims of crime; rather, it is directed
at the societal (rather than individual) interests of punishing wrongdoers
and deterring future potential wrongdoing. 238 One of the more dramatic
illustrations of this point is found in cases of domestic violence where the
victim, after reporting the crime, makes amends with her or his partner
and seeks to withdraw charges. Prosecutors often press forward with the
charges despite the victim's desire to drop the matter because it is not the
victim's direct interests that the prosecutor is pursuing.2 39 Rather, it is
society's interest in punishing the wrongdoer and in discouraging future
wrongdoing by the criminal or by others in society.240
This focus on societal interests rather than the interests of individual
persons makes protection of animals much less problematic in criminal
law than it would be if they were granted plaintiff status in tort law. Un-
like criminal law, tort law focuses on the interests (and, as addressed
above, the human freedom) of the individual persons or proxies for per-
sons involved in the litigation.2 4 1 In tort law, of course, a plaintiff is al-
lowed to discontinue a lawsuit if she wishes to do so, because the lawsuit
is first and foremost a pursuit of her individual interests rather than broad
societal interests.
Further, numerous legislatures have made it clear that societal concern
for the welfare of humans is the deeper issue in criminal animal cruelty
statutes. The first state to enact an animal cruelty statute was Maine. 242
The statute was promoted as a measure to protect human society, be-
cause cruelty to animals corrupts human morality and desensitizes
humans to acts of inflicting pain on other humans. 243 This concern for
human welfare has also served as a primary motivator for the enhance-
ment of animal cruelty laws to felony status in many states since the
238. See JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2006) ("A
crime causes 'social harm,' in that the injury suffered involves 'a breach and violation of
the public rights and duties, due to the whole community."'); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & Aus-
TIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d ed. 2000) ("[C]riminal law is that law which, for
the purpose of preventing harm to society, declares what conduct is criminal and prescribes
the punishment to be imposed for such conduct.").
239. See Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution? 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 873 (1994)
(discussing the conflict between prosecutorial discretion and a victim's desire to withdraw
charges in domestic violence cases); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50
AM. J. CoMP. L. 643, 660-61 (2002) ("[I]n the past two decades some jurisdictions via con-
troversial 'no-drop' legislation have imposed mandatory prosecution of DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE cases, regardless of the desires of the VICTIM.").
240. See Krug, supra note 239, at 660-61.
241. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 208, at 5-6 (stating that tort law "is directed toward
the compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered
within the scope of their legally recognized interests generally .... ").
242. See Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 471, 541 n.461 (noting that the first anti-cruelty statute was passed in Maine,
"Me. Laws ch IV, § 7," and that it was enacted directly "against acts which may be thought
to have a tendency to dull humanitarian feelings and to corrupt the morals of those who




1990s. Stories of Jeffery Dahmer's mutilation of animals as a precursor to
the atrocities he committed on humans are well-known. 244 Such stories,
buttressed by empirical evidence and psychological profiling indicating
that humans who abuse animals are much more likely to eventually abuse
humans as well, were frequently cited as the basis for enhancing the pen-
alty's for animal cruelty to felony status.245
This emphasis on human welfare even in statutes addressing cruelty to
animals is not surprising, given that our legal system and indeed our soci-
ety are inextricably intertwined with humanity and human concerns.
Abusing or failing to care for animals is corrosive to human nature, and
thus barring such behavior is in humanity's interests. Our laws protect
animals, but they do so from a human perspective, and with the human
moral consequences of mistreatment of animals heavily in mind. This
perspective fits well with criminal laws addressing the societal implica-
tions of animal cruelty; it is not a good fit with the idea of effectively
elevating animals to personhood status by making them plaintiffs in tort
lawsuits.
Other statutes A New Tort seeks to identify as stepping stones to
animal tort lawsuits also serve to emphasize law's uniquely human per-
spective. For instance, the article raises the example of the Chimpanzee
Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act, enacted by Con-
gress in 2000, as "representative of incremental legal change on behalf of
animals. ' 24 6 The Act addressed what to do with chimpanzees that had
been used in federally funded research but were no longer needed.24 7
244. See, e.g., David Kelly, Mutilation of Cats Mystifies Denver Police, L.A. TIMES, July
3, 2003, at A18 ("Authorities are concerned because they know that serial killers often
desensitize themselves by killing cats and dogs before turning to people. Well-known mur-
derers like Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer tortured animals."); Nation in Brief, WASH.
POST, Aug. 30, 1998, at A.05 ("A bill that would require people convicted of animal abuse
to obtain psychiatric counseling as a condition of probation is awaiting action by Gov. Pete
Wilson (R). Before Jeffrey L. Dahmer became a serial killer, he cut off the heads of neigh-
borhood pets.").
245. See Joseph Lubinski, The Cow Says Moo, the Duck Says Quack, the Dog Says Vote!
The Use of the Initiative to Promote Animal Protection, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1140
(2003) (noting that "supporters of stronger anti-cruelty laws [in Arkansas] pointed to stud-
ies that suggest animal abuse is often a prelude to violence against humans"); Jacqueline
Tresl, The Broken Window: Laying Down the Law for Animals, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 277, 292-
93 (2002) ("Animal abuse is considered an indicator crime that escalates toward violence
against humans. Also, there is a "direct correlation" between people who abuse animals
and those who abuse children .... Indeed, increasing the violation from a misdemeanor to
a felony is one with which many politicians would agree, but few talk about."). See gener-
ally N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 1999) (listing "aggravated cruelty to
animals" as a felony).
246. Favre, supra note 25, at 350.
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 287 a-3a(a) (2000). The statute outlines the Secretary's responsi-
bilities regarding the lifetime care of research chimpanzees as follows:
The Secretary shall provide for the establishment and operation in accor-
dance with this section of a system to provide for the lifetime care of chim-
panzees that have been used, or were bred or purchased for use, in research
conducted or supported by the National Institutes of Health, the Food and
Drug Administration, or other agencies of the Federal Government, and with
respect to which it has been determined by the Secretary that the chimpan-
zees are not needed for such research.
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One option would have been to euthanize the animals, but instead, Con-
gress voted to create and fund retirement sanctuaries for them.2 48
Humans should treat animals humanely, for humans' sake as well as for
animals' sake. Conscious mistreatment of animals is morally corrosive
for humans, and it both reflects and deepens serious character flaws.249
Thus, every step toward greater protection or concern for animals is not
necessarily a step toward animal rights and personhood. Although A
New Tort seeks to utilize the Chimpanzee Health Improvement statute as
a stepping stone in its arguments for animals as tort plaintiffs, Favre con-
cedes that in debating the legislation "no congressperson took the oppor-
tunity to make the case for animal rights."250
Indeed, the language A New Tort cites as the "clearest statement" by a
congressperson regarding the reason for enacting the law focuses explic-
itly on human concerns. Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire stated
"In other words, because chimpanzees and humans are so similar, those
who work directly in chimpanzee research would find it untenable to con-
tinue using these animals if they were to be killed at the conclusion of the
research. ' '251 Humans should feel concern over killing chimpanzees when
reasonable options are available, regardless of whether they feel that such
animals should have rights. The strong emphasis on human concerns
rather than animal interests in Senator Smith's explanation detracts from,
rather than supports, an argument that the statute provides a progression
toward animal rights. A New Tort argues that the law represents "what is
politically and financially feasible at a moment in time. If this works,
then perhaps this model can be expanded to other species in the fu-
ture. '252 However, there is no evidence that this admirable legislation
had anything to do with the advancement of animal rights. Were this
necessarily the case, every new law that in some way benefits animals
would be a step toward animal rights. To the contrary, law is distinctively
human, and creating laws promoting responsible and humane treatment
of animals is an important responsibility for humans that we ignore at our
peril.
A New Tort claims the Uniform Trusts Act of 2000 as another stepping
stone toward animals as tort plaintiffs, but in reality the Act provides
another illustration of the primacy of human concerns in animal-related
legislation. The Act allows animals to be included in trusts, and for a
Id.
248. Id. § 287 a-3a(d)(2)(I) ("A prohibition that none of the chimpanzees may be sub-
jected to euthanasia, except as in the best interests of the chimpanzee involved, as deter-
mined by the system and an attending veterinarian.").
249. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
250. Favre, supra note 25, at 349.
251. 146 CONG. REC. S11,654, 11,655 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Sen. Smith),
available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r106:S06DE0-0029.
252. Favre, supra note 25, at 350.
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person to be appointed to enforce the trust.253 A New Tort notes that
"legislatures adopting the Uniform Law and associated state statutes ap-
parently did not have any conceptual difficulty with the accommodation
of animals into the existing legal community. ' 254 However, the Act was
designed to benefit humans rather than animals. The goal of laws ad-
dressing the distribution of an individual's assets after the individual's
death is to fulfill the individual's wishes as closely as possible within the
limitations of public policy. 255 This law is consistent with the law's desire
to honor human wishes, rather than a step toward animal rights.
As moral beings, humans have a responsibility toward the animals they
own, and this law empowers humans to exercise that responsibility for the
care of their animals after their deaths. Favre acknowledges that "the
primary motivation may well have been to take care of human con-
cerns." 256 Once again, the focus is on humans. Shifting the focus of
human law to animal interests through allowing animals to sit as plaintiffs
in human courts would not be a small step beyond statutes such as the
Chimpanzee Health Improvement Act and the Uniform Trusts Act of
2000-it would be an enormous and ill-advised leap into an entirely dif-
ferent realm.
B. ADDING BILLIONS OF POTENTIAL NEW PLAINTIFFS AND BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS IN LITIGATION COSTS TO THE UNITED
STATES TORT SYSTEM
In considering the specifics of Professor Favre's proposed new tort, the
potential for gargantuan expansion of the tort system stands out among
numerous serious concerns. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
("PETA") and other animal rights organizations estimate that 25 to 28
billion animals per year are killed for human use in the United States.25 7
Another estimated 360 million animals are kept as pets in the United
253. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 (2003), available at http://www.nabr.org/animallaw/
Trusts/UTC_408.pdf (stating that "(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an
animal" and "(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person").
254. Favre, supra note 25, at 352.
255. DAVID S. FAVRE, ANIMAL PET TRUSTS AND OTHER ESTATE ISSUES (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ovuswillstrusts.htm (stating that "the primary mo-
tivation [of the Uniform Trust Act of 2000] may well have been taking care of the concerns
of human owner of pets").
256. Favre, supra note 25, at 351-52.
257. CNN American Morning with Paula Zahn: Interview with PETA Communications
Director (CNN television broadcast Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0302/28/ltm.10.html ("Today, 28 billion animals in the United States
alone are ... shoved in warehouses, tens of thousands of birds, for example, in warehouses
where they suffocate to death .. "); TaxMeat.com, The Humane Argument, http://www
.taxmeat.com/humane.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) ("More than 26 billion animals are
slaughtered every year for food in the United States alone."); GoVeg.com, 30 Reasons to
Go Vegetarian, http://www.goveg.com/feat/chewonthis/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) ("Every




States, according to a pet industry group.258 According to animal rights
organizations, another 20 million animals are being used for scientific
research.259
A New Tort makes clear that each of these billions of animals would be
eligible for status as plaintiffs if its proposed new tort were accepted. 260
Thus, if the cause of action were adopted, the potential number of tort
plaintiffs in the United States would instantly grow from our current 300
million human citizens261 (in addition to our corporations, foreign plain-
tiffs, etc.) to well over 25 billion.262 The significance of this explosion in
potential plaintiffs is difficult to understate.
One of the more common sound reasons for courts to reject proposed
new tort causes of action or expansions of existing causes of action are
concerns for opening up the floodgates of litigation. As a particularly
relevant example, in 2001 a New Jersey appellate court articulated this
concern in rejecting noneconomic damages for pet owners based on the
wrongful death of a pet. In Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., the court noted,
"We are particularly concerned that were such a claim to go forward, the
law would proceed along a course that had no just stopping point. '263 In
2003, an Ohio appellate court agreed with Harabes in Oberschlake v. Vet-
erinary Associates Animal Hospital.264 In Oberschlake, the owners of a
miniature poodle named "Poopi" sought to name the dog as a plaintiff in
a lawsuit based on a veterinary hospital's alleged negligence, and also
sought to bring a claim in their own names for the emotional distress they
suffered from harm to Poopi.265 The court first declined to allow Poopi
standing as a plaintiff because, although dogs can suffer emotional dis-
tress, "the evidentiary problems with such issues are obvious. 2 66 The
court then went on to dismiss Poopi's owners' emotional distress claims,
stating among other reasons that Harabes was correct to be concerned
about potentially opening a floodgate of litigation were such claims to be
258. See Ann Hoevel, U.S. Is a Nation of 360 Million-Pets: Evolving Relationships
Result in Complicated, Pampered Pets, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/03/10/
modern.pets/index.html (American Pet Products Manufacturers' Association estimates 360
million pets in the United States, outnumbering humans by 60 million).
259. See, e.g., American Association for Laboratory Animal Science, Use of Animals in
Biomedical Research: Understanding the Issues, http://www.aalas.org/pdf/08-00007.pdf#
search= %2220%20million %20animals%20used%20in%20medical%20research%22 (last
visited Nov 12, 2006).
260. Favre discusses potential claims associated with research animals, see, e.g., Favre,
supra note 25, at 354-55, 360-61; pets, see, e.g., id. at 354, 360; and animals used for food or
other economic benefit, see, e.g., id. at 364-65.
261. See CIA, THE WORLD FAC'rBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
geos/us.html (Central Intelligence Agency factsheet estimating 298,444,216 United States
citizens in July 2006).
262. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
263. Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001)
(cited by Victor G. Schwartz & Emily E. Laird, Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation:
The Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 239 (2006)).







Given the huge numbers involved, the enormous expansion of poten-
tial tort plaintiffs would be exceptionally troubling even if animals were
not particularly litigious. But there is every reason to believe that they
would be qaite litigious-or rather, that those seeking to represent their
"interests" would be quite litigious.
A New Tort argues that courts should appoint human representatives to
decide when to sue on behalf of an animal and to represent the animal's
interests in the lawsuit.268 It declines to address the issue in detail, dis-
missing it as "a procedural matter" that should be the subject of further
scholarly consideration but that should not be a bar to creating the pro-
posed tort.269 However, predicting who will be first in line seeking to
initiate lawsuits on behalf of these billions of animals is not difficult.
Large numbers of the volunteers will be animal rights activists passion-
ately committed to utilizing the legal system in any manner possible to
build stepping stones toward animal personhood and the elimination or
erosion of property status. As noted above, interest in using the courts
and legislatures to further an animal rights agenda has experienced dra-
matic growth in recent years. Many of the lawyers and law students par-
ticipating in the rapid expansion of animal law,270 as well as many non-
lawyer animal rights activists, will without doubt view representing an
animal or class of animals in a lawsuit as perhaps the most powerful vehi-
cle yet devised for ultimately achieving the animal rights agenda.
A New Tort in effect emphasizes this by promoting the appropriateness
of applying its tort action to some of the most important uses of animals
in society, which are also among the favorite targets of animal rights ac-
tivists. Many animal rights legal activists vehemently oppose most or all
scientific research on laboratory animals. 271 In addition to legal efforts to
limit or eliminate scientific research on laboratory animals, a radical
fringe's terrorist attacks against animal researchers and research labora-
tories have highlighted the passion such research efforts generate. 272
267. Id.
268. See Favre, supra note 25, at 363-64
269. Id. at 364.
270. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., Laura Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Under-
ground Railroad, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 765, 772 (1995) (explaining the animal rights move-
ment's ultimate goal is to end human use of animals, especially research on laboratory
animals); Ruth Payne, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, and the Path to Social Reform: One
Movement's Struggle for Coherency in the Quest for Change, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 587,
596-98 (2002) (discussing the animal rights movement and its belief that all animal experi-
mentation should be disallowed).
272. See, e.g., Charles Burress, Activists Denounce Research on Animals / Cops Stop
Shovel Protest Above UC's Underground Labs, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 2004, at B5 (detailing
protest by animal rights activists who thrust shovels into the courtyard above an under-
ground animal-research laboratory on UC Berkeley's campus); Seattle Man Among 6
Animal Rights Activists Convicted by Federal Jury, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A4,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002840714_animal03.html
(detailing the conviction of members of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty who waged a
campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences, a British company engaged in animal testing).
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A New Tort chooses to utilize a chimpanzee in a scientific research lab-
oratory as the context for one of its three primary hypotheticals demon-
strating how its proposal would operate.273 The chimpanzee in the
article's hypothetical is kept in a manner meeting the requirements of the
Animal Welfare Act but is not given all of the environmental amenities
that some activists believe are appropriate. 274 If a legal representative for
the chimpanzee (again, the burgeoning legal animal rights community
would supply a surfeit of volunteers for this role) were to sue to attain a
better environment in the research laboratory, A New Tort states that
"under the proposed tort, [the research laboratory] would have to make
its case to a court. '2 75
Such a consequence could be disastrous for HIV research and other
areas of medical research that rely on the use of animals. As addressed
below, Favre proposes that his tort include money damages awards,276
and such awards would of course have a chilling effect on research. How-
ever, even if researchers were usually found by jurors to have acted ap-
propriately in caring for the chimpanzee, and thus money damages
awards were few, the litigation would likely be devastating to medical
animal research.
In tort lawsuits, litigation costs-primarily attorney's fees and expert
witness fees-often exceed the money damages awarded. 277 Even when
no damages are awarded, litigation costs for each lawsuit can cost hun-
dreds of thousands or sometimes even millions of dollars. For example,
in asbestos litigation, in which most cases settle rather than lingering
through a full trial, a study found that out of the $70 billion spent on
asbestos litigation between the 1960s and 2002, $40 billion was spent on
legal fees rather than on judgments.278
The tendency for lawsuits to settle, as illustrated in asbestos litigation,
keeps litigation costs from being even higher, as would be the case if most
lawsuits proceeded all the way through trial. According to one study,
ninety-eight percent of lawsuits settle before trial.279 Unfortunately,
there are strong reasons for concern that animal tort lawsuits would settle
significantly less frequently than do typical tort lawsuits, making animal
tort lawsuits even more expensive to litigate. Tort lawsuits typically settle
because both parties believe that settling is in their best financial interest.
273. See Favre, supra note 25, at 354-55.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 355.
276. See infra notes 312-21 and accompanying text.
277. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS?
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 9 (2002), available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/cea/tortliabilitysystem-apr02.pdf (stating that fifty-eight percent of
tort costs go toward administration, claimants' attorney fees, and defense costs).
278. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 88 (2005) (explaining that
of the $70 billion spent on asbestos litigation, defense transaction costs comprised $21 bil-
lion while claimant's transaction costs accounted for $19 billion).
279. Susan Pang Gochros, Settlement Conferences: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly,
HAw. B.J., Nov. 2003, at 10.
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However, as noted above, activist Steven Wise probably spoke for most
attorneys interested in animal law when he stated that money damages
are often not the most important matter in animal-related tort lawsuits. 280
Creating stepping stones toward abolishing or eroding the property status
of animals is likely much more appealing to animal rights activists than is
making as much money as possible from lawsuits. 281 Although settle-
ments would doubtlessly sometimes be reached, much of the motivation
for compromise from the plaintiff's perspective in traditional tort litiga-
tion would be absent. Further, it is expected that animal rights activists
would be cognizant that numerous lengthy legal battles might drain re-
search laboratories' resources and limit their ability to continue undertak-
ing such research. Even if very few of the lawsuits result in judgments,
opening up tort litigation in this context might well signal the end of sci-
entific research that presently provides enormous public health benefits.
Opening up tort lawsuits by animals against the meat and dairy indus-
tries would perhaps cause even more societal upheaval, at least from an
economic perspective. A New Tort proposes to somehow bar lawsuits
based on the permissibility of killing animals for food from its animal tort
cause of action, yet allow lawsuits based on the quality of life afforded to
animals used for food.2 82 In practice, the article's proposed distinction
might make little difference, as those passionately opposed to eating ani-
mals or to the use of other animal products would have countless oppor-
tunities to initiate costly lawsuits even without reaching the question of
whether animals may in any circumstances be killed. As noted above,
animal rights activists estimate that 25 to 28 billion animals are killed for
food or other human use in the United States every year.283 Almost any
approach to treatment of livestock or other animals kept for economic
uses could be at least argued to be inappropriate. As with scientific re-
search on animals, animal rights activists would not even need to be suc-
cessful in winning judgments to create enormous havoc. Given the scale
of animal use for food or other economic benefit in our society, simply
bringing lawsuits addressing even a small percentage of the billions of
potential animal plaintiffs could lead to overwhelmed courts and nation-
wide economic blight.
C. ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED NEW TORT
Professor Favre suggests that an animal plaintiff should prevail in his
proposed new tort if the animal's representative can establish the follow-
ing elements:
280. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., Susan Gilmore, Lawyer Breaking New Legal Ground on Animal Issues,
SEATFLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at B1 (quoting the only attorney in the state whose practice
is limited to cases involving animals as stating that "[it's more a way of life than a philoso-
phy," and noting a client's assertion that "[wihat [the lawyer] does is a labor of love").
282. See Favre, supra note 25, at 364-65.
283. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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1) That an interest exists that is of fundamental importance to the
plaintiff animal;
2) That the fundamental interest has been interfered with or harmed
by the actions or inactions of defendant; and
3) That the weight and nature of the interests of the animal plaintiff
substantially outweigh the weight and nature of the interests of the
human defendant. 284
1. An Interest of Fundamental Importance to the Animal
A New Tort's proposed requirement that the interest at issue must be
of fundamental importance to the animal seems designed to ensure that
no trivial matters, but rather only matters of true significance, are suc-
cessfully litigated. The word "successfully" in the previous sentence is
key, as animal rights activists would be able to claim that any number of
interests are fundamental to a particular animal and would have an op-
portunity to impose costly litigation on animal owners to address such
issues in the courts. As noted in the discussion of a potential flood of
lawsuits against research laboratories and the animal food industry, the
ultimate success of such lawsuits may not be necessary to make such uses
of animals much more expensive and difficult.
A New Tort asserts that there "is not a bright line test" regarding ani-
mals' fundamental interests, and that this "obviously will force the court
to make a judgment call."'285 This constitutes an invitation to wide-scale
litigation on the issue. In some areas, whether something is fundamental
to animals is obvious, such as freedom from intentional torture. In these
areas, existing laws, such as animal cruelty laws and the Animal Welfare
Act, already provide protection (whether such statutes should be
strengthened or broadened are important but separate questions beyond
the scope of this article). Further, for a much larger class of issues,
whether something is fundamental to an animal would have to be fought
out in costly litigation. As one of countless potential examples, A New
Tort contends that being able to reproduce "is fundamental to all living
beings. '2 86 Presumably this means that every time pet owners decide to
have their pets spayed or neutered, they may have to fight lawsuits over
whether this infringement on their animal's fundamental interest is justi-
fied. They might also be subject to lawsuits when they prevent their pets
from going over the fence to mate with a neighboring pet. Even if such
lawsuits are not ultimately successful, allowing them into the courts is
societally costly and bad public policy to say the least.
This raises another problem: beyond the obvious, how are humans to
decide what are fundamental interests to other species? One might argue
that the very endeavor is presumptuous. Further, one might suspect that
the vague standard proposed by A New Tort would allow activists to pro-
284. Favre, supra note 25, at 353.
285. Id. at 357.
286. Id. at 358.
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ject onto animals the activists' own ideas on what is best for the animals.
Steven Wise's lawsuit addressed above in which he sought to name Kama,
a Navy research dolphin, as a plaintiff may be illustrative. 287 Wise argued
that Kama, the named plaintiff, was harmed by the Navy's activities with
it.28 8 However, the Navy retorted that Kama mingled freely with wild
dolphins on a regular basis, that Kama could easily swim away from his
work with the Navy but chose not to do so, and that Kama was indeed
happy with his work for the Navy.289 Humans are not capable of know-
ing Kama's mind and heart sufficiently to ascertain whether freedom
from his labors with the Navy was fundamental to him. Favre argues that
"if we cannot say what is fundamental to an animal, then the doors of the
courtroom will remain closed until such information is available. '290
However, he does not indicate how we would be able to close those
doors, and doing so seems unlikely. Activists may find the doors to actu-
ally winning judgments in such cases closed, but the doors to causing
enormous aggregate litigation expenses and burden on the courts in bat-
tles over whether we can know whether an interest is fundamental would
be wide open.
2. Causation (and Intent)
The proposed element that the animal must establish that the funda-
mental interest has been interfered with or harmed by the actions or inac-
tions of the defendant appears intended as a general causation element.
Confusingly, however, A New Tort labels its discussion of this proposed
element as "Intention of the Defendant" 291 rather than in referring in any
way to causation. The article briefly acknowledges that establishing cau-
sation is "axiomatic" in tort lawsuits but then quickly shifts its discussion
to the question of intent.
The level of requisite intent is an issue in all tort lawsuits but it is not
addressed in A New Tort's list of proposed elements. In its section ad-
dressing the causation element, the article reveals Favre's view that tort's
intent standard should not consider whether the human defendant in-
tended the specific consequence of her acts. Rather, the standard should
be met if the defendant intended the act at issue, regardless of intent
regarding consequences. 292
Analyzing the intent element of an intentional tort in this manner is
supported by precedent.2 93 However, A New Tort seeks to modify the
intent element further in a manner that would be exceptionally prejudi-
287. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
288. Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New Eng. Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45, 47 (D. Mass. 1993) ("The Navy has invested over $ 700,000 and over 3,500
man hours training Kama. The Navy contends that Kama is able to associate with wild
dolphins on a daily basis, and could swim away if he so desired.")
289. Id.
290. Favre, supra note 25, at 358.
291. See id. at 359.
292. See id.
293. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 52-53 (2000)
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cial to defendants. It proposes, in effect, that the burden of proof be
shifted to the animal's owner to presume that the owner understood the
fundamental interests of the animal's species.2 94 How the owner can
fairly be presumed to know an animals' fundamental interests when de-
termining such interests, as A New Tort acknowledges, "is not a bright
line test" and will often require courts to make a "judgment call" is not
addressed 295 Indeed, such an onerous presumption in the face of such a
vague and ambiguous standard seems spectacularly unfair. Further, it
seems contrary to A New Tort's own assertion in the article's section ad-
dressing the fundamental interest element that "[o]bviously the test can-
not be whether humans know everything about a species, as we do not
yet even know everything about ourselves. '2 96
3. Animal Interests Substantially Outweigh Human Interests
A New Tort's final formally identified element2 97 is that the animal's
representative must establish that the weight and nature of the interests
of the animal plaintiff substantially outweigh the weight and nature of the
interests of the human defendant. The proposition that a tort action
should only be permitted if the plaintiff can first prove that her interest
substantially outweighs the other party's interest is, at least, unusual in
tort law. Nuisance torts come to mind as claims requiring substantial and
unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's interests,2 98 but these ele-
ments are much different from A New Tort's "substantially outweighs"
standard. In nuisance law, "substantial" means only a significant harm.2 99
The "unreasonable" requirement in nuisance law does entail balancing,
but it is a simple weighing of interests rather than a requirement that one
party's interests be "substantially" stronger than the other party's inter-
ests. 3°° A New Tort indicates, however, that its odd standard is necessary
because without it there is no hope that society as it currently exists
would accept the tort.301
The odd nature of this element highlights the tort's general vagueness
and ambiguity and the significant stretching of accepted tort principles it
would represent. Courts tend to disfavor superlatives in tort elements
because superlatives tend to signal doctrinal fuzziness and lack of clarity
regarding when tort elements are established. For example, the concept
(The defendant is subject to liability for a simple battery when he intention-
ally causes bodily contact to the plaintiff in a way not justified by the plain-
tiff's apparent wishes .... An intent to cause actual harm is a sufficient intent
but not a necessary one. It is enough that the defendant intends the bodily
contact that is 'offensive'. ...).
294. See Favre, supra note 25, at 359.
295. Id. at 357.
296. Id.
297. In reality, the proposal seeks to incorporate additional elements not included in its
list of the proposed elements. See infra notes 304-21 and accompanying text.
298. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 208, at 626-30.
299. Id. at 626.
300. Id. at 626, 629-30.
301. See Favre, supra note 25, at 359.
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of "gross negligence" has largely wilted on the common law vine. Most
courts have rejected the standard, reasoning that negligence is negligence,
and that seeking to make distinctions between gross and "regular" negli-
gence is confusing and unproductive. 302
Even with the proposed limitation that the animal's interest must sub-
stantially outweigh the owner's interest, this element will, like the "funda-
mental interest" element, invite excessive litigation, lack of certainty
regarding the law, and inconsistent decisions by courts. When are an
animal's interests "substantially" stronger than the owner's interests
rather than simply stronger, clearly stronger, or stronger by a little bit?
Although some cases would be obvious, such as when an owner wishes to
torture his animal to satisfy the owner's sadism, in most situations the
balancing would not be so apparent, and costly case-by-case litigation
would be needed to make findings. Different courts would doubtlessly
weigh the interests differently, inviting inconsistent and confusing case
law.
Animal rights activists' potential attraction to the legal messiness this
tort would create, which would in turn further magnify the messiness,
bears repeating. To the extent that animal lawyers perceive themselves as
working toward vitally important public policy concerns, the profit factor
that heavily influences most litigation is diminished on the plaintiff's side.
Animal rights activists' passion likely makes them willing to accept no
compensation or less compensation than they could otherwise earn if
they believe they are potentially making a difference for their cause.303 If
the very existence of expansive litigation, regardless of whether most of it
ultimately does not result in a plaintiff's judgment, hurts those perform-
ing scientific research on animals, those raising animals for food, and so
forth, many animal rights activists would feel that they are furthering
their cause by initiating as many of these tort actions as possible.
D. DAMAGES, OTHER REMEDIES, AND OTHER ELEMENTS TO THE
PROPOSED TORT
Although A New Tort lists only three vague and ambiguous elements
for its proposed cause of action, the article's full proposal makes clear
that the tort would in actuality be even more complicated. Details pro-
vided in A New Tort suggest that several other conditions, which are in
effect additional tort elements, would need to be met. The article de-
302. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 208, at 210-11 ("The prevailing rule in most situa-
tions is that there are no 'degrees' of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there are only
different amounts of care, as a matter of fact."); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 182 (4th ed. 1971) ("Although 'degrees of negligence' has not been without its ad-
vocates, it has been condemned by most writers, and, except in bailment cases, rejected at
common law by nearly all courts .... "). For examples of courts rejecting the gross negli-
gence standard, see, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989); Biscoe v. Arling-
ton County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220,
227 (5th Cir. 1983); Wells v. State, 642 A.2d 879, 884 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Foster v.
Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976).
303. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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scribes most of these additional elements in a section toward the end of
its proposal in a section aptly entitled "Loose Strings. ' 304 One of these is
the intent element, which is not among A New Tort's three stated ele-
ments but which, as discussed above, the article addresses in its discussion
of causation. 305 Another element not listed among the article's three for-
mal elements is that the plaintiffs must be owned animals, rather than
wild animals-at least for now. Noting that "the analysis for wildlife is
more complex than the proposed tort" because wild animals are not
property and because they are capable of existence without the aid of
humans, A New Tort indicates that more thought must be given regarding
wild animals' potential status as tort plaintiffs. 30 6
Of course, this open question adds yet another layer of complexity and
uncertainty to the proposed tort, yet the article goes further to suggest a
possible approach to wild animals that would make the tort even more
onerous. The article suggests that perhaps the burden of proof should
shift to human defendants in cases involving wild animals, such that de-
fendants would have the burden of proving "a substantial human need
before allowing interference with such animals" 3 7-presumably even if
the human is engaged in activity not violating any statutes or regulations.
Thus, a homeowner wishing to rid her lawn of gophers or to rid her
flowerbeds of snails might be subject to lawsuits in which she will be
found liable unless she can establish-potentially at great litigation ex-
pense of course-that she has a "substantial human need" to interfere
with these animals.
Another element A New Tort adds but does not list as a formal element
is that the plaintiff must be making a claim for something other than the
simple fact of being killed for food or for other economic benefit.308
Rather, as addressed above, claims involving animals used for food or
other economic use would only be allowed to focus on how the animals
are treated while alive.30 9 Apparently, A New Tort included this addi-
tional element because society has not yet been persuaded that animals
should not be killed for human use. Of course, this additional element or
caveat adds yet another layer of complexity to the proposed tort.
A final element or restriction A New Tort adds to its proposal but does
not list among the formal tort elements is that owners' interests must be
something more than mere profit motivation. 310 The article includes this
element because there are many other alternatives in the world for mak-
ing money, so a profit motive alone should not, according to the article,
304. The section's full title is "Loose Strings-Additional Points Before Proceeding."
Favre, supra note 25, at 362.
305. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
306. Favre, supra note 25, at 362.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 364.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 365.
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justify imposing on an animal's fundamental interests.311 Thus, if a free
range chicken rancher provided one-tenth of an acre per chicken on
which his chickens could roam, and an activist suing on behalf of the
chickens argued that it is in the chickens' interest to have even more
space-perhaps one-fourth of an acre per chicken-in which to roam,
presumably the chicken rancher would not be able to rely on his addi-
tional profit from restricting the chickens to one-tenth of an acre each as
his interest in not giving them yet more space. Instead, he would be re-
stricted to arguing that providing one-tenth of an acre each is not cruel,
but what if one-forth of an acre each would provide an even more pleas-
ant environment for the chickens? The rancher does not have an "inter-
est" in the fact that one-tenth of an acre per chicken is enough; probably
his only interest in keeping his chickens' range down to that size would be
making more profit, and he would presumably be unable to rely upon
that important interest as his defense even if his chickens' living condi-
tions are relatively good.
As noted above, one of the most societally destructive aspects of A
New Tort's proposed action is its open invitation to an enormous expan-
sion of litigation, regardless of whether much of the litigation would ulti-
mately prove successful. 312 Given the billions of potential new plaintiffs
and the passion of animal rights attorneys willing to damper lawyers'
usual profit motive because of their idealism, litigation costs to animal
owners and burden on the courts alone could be overwhelming.313 How-
ever, A New Tort further compounds this problem by asserting that when
the lawsuits are successful, the animals should be awarded money dam-
ages in addition to other remedies. Further, it suggests a compensatory
damages standard inconsistent with courts' accepted approach to such
damages.
A New Tort includes pain and suffering damages in its list of appropri-
ate categories of damages animals should be able to recover. 314 The arti-
cle suggests that the money could be placed into trusts for the animals'
benefit created by the courts.315 Obviously this could generate a huge
amount of money overall if even only a small percentage of all of the
lawsuits that might be brought for billions of animals were successful.
The enormous draining of society's financial resources would not be
the only cost of allowing animal plaintiffs to win pain and suffering dam-
ages awards. There is also a problem regarding the limits of humans'
capacity to understand animals and thus make appropriate awards for
their pain and suffering. Awarding money to compensate pain and suffer-
311. Id.
312. See supra notes 257-67 and accompanying text.
313. See notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
314. See Favre, supra note 25, at 366. In addition to money damages, Professor Favre
suggests injunctions and "title transfer" (in which title might involuntarily be transferred
from the defendant to another party that might provide better care for the animal) as




ing requires creative and abstract thinking on the parts of jurors and
courts even in cases involving humans, and such awards have recently
been a point of significant focus in tort law scholarship-much of it criti-
cal of the notion that dollars can compensate pain.316 As difficult as it is
for jurors and courts to determine how much money would be needed to
compensate the pain and suffering involved in a particular case involving
humans, trying to determine a dollar amount appropriate to compensate
pain and suffering for another species borders on absurdity-particularly
when money is meaningless to all nonhuman species.
A New Tort seeks to address this challenge by suggesting that compen-
satory damages in these lawsuits should perhaps be set at the amount of
money "sufficient to assure the conditions do not reoccur. '317 A fly in
the ointment in this proposed approach to compensatory damages is that
it has nothing to do with compensatory damages. Compensatory dam-
ages narrowly focus on the plaintiff-specifically, making the plaintiff
whole from the harm suffered in the case before the court. 318 Compen-
sating the plaintiff may have a deterrent effect, but compensatory dam-
ages are not structured toward that end. They do not take into account
the wealth of the defendant, how likely the defendant is to commit the
wrong again, etc. They only focus on remedying the plaintiff's loss.
31 9
Punitive damages, rather than compensatory damages, allow a focus on
defendants and on deterring future misconduct. They are not designed to
compensate plaintiffs, but rather to deter defendants and potential future
defendants from committing further bad acts, and to provide punish-
ment. 32 0 Many people would be dubious about further expanding already
controversial punitive damages by opening them up to billions of poten-
316. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773,
781-83 (1995) (discussing the problem of translating an intangible, nonmonetary injury into
a monetary award for pain and suffering and remarking that jury awards often are arbi-
trary because they are given only ambiguous guidelines in how to determine the award
amount); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 171-76 (2004) (arguing that money damages for pain and
suffering do not negate the victim's pain and explaining the difficulty for juries in placing a
monetary value on pain and suffering); Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond:
Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 374 (2006) (re-
marking on the unpredictability of pain and suffering awards due to the lack of a fixed
standard for determining these awards).
317. Favre, supra note 25, at 366.
318. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation Law, 43 U. KAN. L.
REV. 39, 45 (1994) ("The commonly understood goal of tort compensation is to restore the
injured to their preaccident condition, to make them whole."); Steven D. Smith, The Critics
and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
765, 769 (1987) (stating the "cardinal principle" of compensation as "injured plaintiffs
should receive an amount necessary to make them 'whole,' that is, to restore them to the
position they would have occupied but for the defendant's tortious conduct").
319. See supra note 318.
320. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 293, at 1063 (discussing that the purpose of punitive
damages is to deter and make repetition of the undesirable conduct unlikely); Robert A.
Klinck, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Punitive Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
469, 470 (2001) (stating that a major rationale for punitive damages is deterrence); Jane
Mallor & Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to a Principled Approach? 50
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tial new plaintiffs, and it is important to identify when they are in effect
being expanded.
Although protecting animals and caring for their welfare is necessary in
a moral society, awarding money to animals simply seems odd. Perhaps,
to some, an attraction of awarding such damages is that they could pro-
vide income to animal rights' lawyers suing on behalf of animals. Most
tort lawsuits are filed on a contingency fee basis, with the plaintiff's law-
yer receiving a percentage of the recovery. 32' If the dominant contin-
gency fee approach were applied to animal tort lawsuits, activist lawyers
who might not receive any compensation for winning an injunction could
perhaps earn their living-with billions of potential plaintiffs, possibly
even a very comfortable living-through winning damages awards for
their animal clients. This financial incentive of course would attract yet
more activist lawyers (and, if the money is good enough, even nonactivist
lawyers) toward filing animal plaintiff lawsuits. Because the cause is im-
portant to many lawyers interested in animal rights, even modest judg-
ments in lawsuits involving animal plaintiffs might fuel rapid expansion of
such cases. Due to the potential quantity of lawsuits and huge potential
litigation costs associated with animal-plaintiff lawsuits, allowing such
lawsuits could be societally disastrous even if damages were not permit-
ted as a remedy. Adding damages as a remedy makes the potential harm
yet worse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Seeking to further the humane treatment of helpless and too-often mis-
treated animals is important, even heroic. However, taking the path of
incrementally humanizing animals in our courts, whether through creat-
ing personhood for intelligent animals, through granting animals standing
as plaintiffs in tort lawsuits, or through any of the other potential stepping
stones toward abolishing animals' property status, is misguided and dan-
gerous for both humans and animals. Our legal system is intrinsically
human, and the protection and humane treatment of animals is a basic
human responsibility, not a basic animal right.
HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1002 (1999) (explaining that the purpose of punitive damages is to
discourage the defendant and others from committing bad acts).
321. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES
& MATERIALS 544 n.9 (11th ed. 2005) ("Lawyers who represent plaintiffs in personal injury
litigation usually are paid on the basis of a contingency fee contract.").
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